

# The Architecture of Tawḥīd

The Grammar, Creed, and Covenant of Lā Ilāha Illā Allāh

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K. Mufti | الطالب الفقير

Allen, TX — March 10, 2026

FIRST EDITION



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## The Architecture of Tawḥīd

The Grammar, Creed, and Covenant of Lā Ilāha Illā Allāh

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رَبِّ اشرحْ لِي صَدْرِي وَيَسِّرْ لِي اَمْرِي

"My Lord, expand for me my breast and ease for me my task." — Qur'an 20:25–26

## Author's Introduction

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ، وَالصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَى أَشْرَفِ الْمُرْسَلِينَ، نَبِيِّنَا مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِهِ  
وَصَحْبِهِ أَجْمَعِينَ.

This work is a labor of love. It began as a personal desire to understand the sentence I recite more than any other, the sentence through which I entered this religion, the sentence I will be asked about in my grave, and the sentence I pray will be on my tongue when I draw my last breath.

What you hold in your hands is not the product of detached academic scholarship. It is the effort of a servant who simply wanted to know what he was saying when he uttered *لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ*—and who found, in the course of that pursuit, that the Arabic language itself, governed by revelation, had encoded within this phrase a precision and a depth that most of us pass over without realizing.

I do not present this work as flawless. I present it as sincere, or at least as my utmost striving toward sincerity. I ask Allāh, the Most Generous, to purify whatever good is in these pages from the stain of self-regard, and to make this effort a fruit of genuine *ikhlas*: done for His Face alone, seeking no audience but Him.

Whatever truth is found in this work is from Allāh alone. Whatever error exists is from my own shortcomings and from the Shayṭān, and I ask Allāh's forgiveness for it.

I hope, with the profound hope of one who knows his own weakness, that this humble effort will be something I can present when I stand before Allāh on a Day when I will

have nothing else to offer. I ask Him, subhānahu wa ta'ālā, to accept it from me, to add it to my scale of good deeds, and to make it heavy upon the mīzān on a Day when nothing will be of use except what was done with a sound heart.

And I ask every reader who benefits from anything in these pages to remember me in du'a'. For the living are in need of the prayers of their brothers, and the dead are in even greater need.

اللَّهُمَّ اجْعَلْ هَذَا الْعَمَلَ خَالِصًا لَوَجْهِكَ الْكَرِيمِ، وَاجْعَلْهُ فِي مِيزَانِ حَسَنَاتِي يَوْمَ لَا يَنْفَعُ  
مَالٌ وَلَا بَنُونَ إِلَّا مَنْ أَتَى اللَّهَ بِقَلْبٍ سَلِيمٍ. وَصَلَّى اللَّهُ وَسَلَّمْ عَلَى نَبِيِّنَا مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِهِ  
وَصَحْبِهِ أَجْمَعِينَ.

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## How to Use This Work

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Every Muslim knows the shahādah. Far fewer know how it works — how the Arabic sentence itself produces the meaning of exclusive worship, why other readings were rejected, and what the testimony demands beyond verbal repetition. This book exists to close that gap.

You can read it straight through as a single argument, or consult it by part and chapter according to your question. Here is how the book is organized:

**Part I — Revelation and Framing** (Chapters 1–4) starts where the religion starts: with revelation. It establishes why the testimony matters, who this work is written for, and grounds the inquiry in the Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah before any grammatical analysis begins.

**Part II — Grammar of the Formula** (Chapters 5–9) opens the sentence up. It examines both halves of the testimony in detail: the total negation carried by «لَا إِلَهَ»، the divine name and its derivation, the exception carried by «إِلَّا اللَّهُ»، the missing predicate that must be inferred, and the grammatical positions assigned to the divine name after the exception.

**Part III — Restriction, Theology, and Synthesis** (Chapters 10–12) asks how the sentence actually delivers its force. It resolves the legal-theoretical debates over signification, states what the testimony actually negates and affirms, and gathers the results into a unified synthesis.

**Part IV — Conditions, Consequences, and Weight** (Chapters 13–15) turns from what the testimony means to what it demands. It covers the conditions that must be met for the testimony to count, the weight it carries when those conditions are fulfilled, and the acts that breach the covenant it establishes.

**Part V — Conclusion and Appendices** (Chapter 16 and Appendices A–D) restates the final result and provides reference tools: a glossary, scholar and source note cards, hadith indexes, and comparison tables.

**Two reading paths.** If you want the central ruling quickly, read the chapter-opening verdicts, the comparison tables, Chapter 12 (the guided synthesis), and the conclusion. If you want the full argument — from grammar through lived obligation — follow the main text from Part I through Part V and use the appendices for terminology, scholars, and proof-texts.

**How the book sounds.** The chapter openings and closings are written to orient you — they use plain English, state what the chapter will establish, and summarize what it proved. The body of each chapter is denser and more technical: it carries the full scholarly apparatus, the Arabic evidence, and the detailed objection-response exchanges. You do not need to master every technical paragraph to follow the argument. But if you want the proof behind the ruling, the body is where it lives.

**Method.** Revelation comes first. The meaning of the testimony is governed by the Qur'an and the Prophetic teaching before it is expanded by later analysis. Grammar and rhetoric are treated as servants of meaning, not as detached display. Competing views are preserved fairly but ranked: you are told early which view is strongest, why it is strongest, and what the weaker views were trying to protect. Extended scholarly quotations and source-critical detail are placed in chapter-grouped endnotes so the main reading line stays clean.

**Terms and transliteration.** When a technical term appears for the first time, the book gives you the English concept first, then the Arabic script and transliteration. After that, the transliteration is usually kept on its own. Qur'anic and hadīth references are placed at the doctrinal turning points so the governing proofs remain visible inside the argument.

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# **PART I — Revelation and Framing**

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## Chapter 1 — Why “Lā Ilāha Illā Allāh” Bears the Weight of the Religion

Islam can fill hundreds of volumes. It can also be summarized in a matter of seconds — the time it takes to say لا إله إلا الله. That a religion this vast can be compressed into a single sentence is itself a sign of its divine origin. But it also means that if this sentence is misunderstood, everything built on it becomes unstable.

This chapter establishes a single point: the testimony is not a slogan. It is the central claim of the religion, and it must be studied with the same seriousness that the religion itself demands.

### Why this inquiry matters

This religion is upright and sound. No one doubts its divine origin except the stubbornly combative and willfully blind. No matter which way you look at it, you come away knowing that it is not a product of human invention — that it transcends the capacity of the human mind.

Consider, for example, the breadth of this religion: how thoroughly it encompasses every aspect of human life, interprets everything people need, and governs every sphere in which the children of Adam move. Then consider, from another angle, that this vast and all-encompassing religion has been summed up — miraculously — in a single sentence: the Pure Word (الكلمة الطيبة — al-kalimah al-ṭayyibah).

Once this is established, it becomes intellectually necessary to give the Pure Word its due attention — from the standpoints of morphology (صرف — ṣarf), grammatical analysis (إعراب — i‘rāb), rhetoric (بلاغة — balāghah), and theology (معتقد — mu‘taqad). And it becomes pedagogically necessary to expound upon it at length, clarify its contents, explain its purposes, and shed light on how people understand it. For there is no doubt that whoever goes astray in understanding it has gone astray in understanding Islam in its entirety — and whoever misinterprets it has misinterpreted the whole of divine law.

‘Alī al-Qārī writes: “It is therefore incumbent upon every sincere believer to pay close attention to this testimony in both its form (mabnā) and its meaning (ma’nā), so as to move from grasping the benefit of its wording to renewing the meaning it carries. For it is the key to Paradise and a refuge from the Fire by virtue of the position it holds. The leading scholars of this community made clear that one must understand its meaning, which rests upon knowing its form, so as to emerge from the shackles of blind imitation and enter into verified certainty and enduring support. Allāh Most High said: «فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ».”

This work gathers everything that has been said about “لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ” in terms of grammatical analysis and rhetoric. It sets for itself two conditions: comprehensiveness in covering scholarly opinions, to the extent possible; and accessibility of language and clarity of thought, with illustrative examples, so that even the non-specialist can follow along.

This work also attempts something that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, has not been done in the English-language Islamic library: a single sustained treatment of the shahādah that moves from Qur’anic governance through Arabic grammar and morphology, through rhetoric and legal theory, to creed and lived obligation — keeping all four disciplines in conversation throughout.

**Core Qur’an and hadith references:** Qur’an 47:19, Qur’an 3:18, Jāmi‘ al-Tirmidhī 3383.

## Chapter 1 — Closing takeaway

The inquiry that follows is not optional. If the Pure Word carries the entire religion in a single sentence — if it is, as al-Qārī said, the key to Paradise and a refuge from the Fire — then its grammar, rhetoric, and doctrinal content must be understood with the same seriousness that the religion itself demands. To misunderstand the testimony is to misunderstand the whole of divine law.

The next chapter explains who this work is written for and why this depth is necessary.

## Chapter 2 — Who This Work Is For and Why It Matters

The previous chapter established that the Pure Word carries the weight of the entire religion. This chapter explains why a work of this depth is needed, who it is written for, and what gap it fills.

### Why this depth is necessary

In the Islamic tradition, grammar is not a secular or detached science. It is the armor of creed — the protective structure that keeps the testimony’s meaning precise. A believer who repeats the shahādah without knowing its linguistic boundaries is wielding a sword without a hilt: the words are present, but the precision that protects and directs them is absent.

Consider the consequences of a single grammatical choice. If a Muslim says لا إله إلا الله but mentally infers the omitted predicate as “exists,” that Muslim has merely affirmed what the polytheists of Mecca already believed. The polytheists knew that Allāh existed as the Creator — the Qur’an itself records this:

«وَلَئِنْ سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ لَيَقُولُنَّ اللَّهُ» (سورة العنكبوت: 61)

“And if you asked them, ‘Who created the heavens and the earth?’ they would surely say, ‘Allāh.’”

What they refused was not the existence of Allāh but His exclusive right to worship. That is exactly the distinction this work is built to clarify. The difference between a testimony that reports existence and one that demands exclusive worship is not a fine scholarly point. It is the difference between monotheism (tawḥīd — توحيد) and what falls short of it.

This is why the technical thickness of the chapters that follow is not academic excess. It is the antidote to the superficiality that allows the shahādah to be repeated without being understood. The work moves the reader from blind repetition (taqlīd — تقلید) to verified certainty (yaqīn — يقين): intellectually grounded confidence in what the testimony actually says, what it negates, and what it demands.

## Who this work is written for

This study is not written for the absolute beginner. It assumes the reader knows what the shahādah is and has some familiarity with Arabic terminology, even if introductory. Three audiences will benefit most:

**Advanced students of knowledge:** Those studying Arabic grammar or Islamic creed who need to see how syntax shapes theology. Chapters 5 through 9 contain the parsing disputes; Chapter 12 shows how the technical details converge on a single doctrinal result.

**Imams, chaplains, and educators:** Those who teach the shahādah to audiences that ask structural and logical questions. Modern students do not accept “this is what it means” without explanation. They ask how the sentence produces that meaning, why other readings were rejected, and what the testimony demands beyond verbal repetition. This work equips the teacher to answer with precision.

**Academics and translators:** Scholars of comparative religion, Semitic languages, or Islamic legal theory who need a rigorous English-language treatment of the shahādah’s internal structure.

## What gap this work fills

The English-language Islamic library is not short of books that explain what لا إله إلا الله means. What it lacks is a work that shows how the sentence means what it means — at the level of grammar, rhetoric, legal theory, and creed simultaneously.

In Arabic, this territory is well served. Scholars such as Nāẓir al-Jaysh, Ibn Hishām, and al-Dasūqī examined the shahādah’s parsing, its omitted predicate, its restriction mechanism, and its doctrinal force with extraordinary precision. But that scholarship has remained largely

inaccessible to the English-reading Muslim. Not because it is secret, but because the analytical vocabulary it requires has not been systematically presented in English before.

This work bridges that gap. It does not replace the Arabic originals. But it makes their arguments available, in structured form, to readers who would otherwise have no path to them.

## **What lies ahead**

The work proceeds in five parts. Part I (Chapters 1 through 4) grounds the inquiry in revelation and maps the sentence's structure. Part II (Chapters 5 through 9) examines the grammar in detail. Part III (Chapters 10 through 12) shows how the sentence delivers its force and gathers the results into a synthesis. Part IV (Chapters 13 through 15) turns from what the testimony means to what it demands: conditions, weight, and boundaries. Part V (Chapter 16 and the appendices) concludes the study and provides reference tools.

The reader who follows this path from beginning to end will emerge with a complete understanding of the shahādah: what it says, how it says it, what it demands, and what threatens it.

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## Chapter 3 — The Qur’anic and Prophetic Basis of the Phrase

Before the work enters grammar, the testimony must be grounded in the authority that governs everything that follows: revelation. The Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunnah do not merely mention the shahādah — they assign it a rank, a function, and a set of consequences. This chapter lays out the scriptural evidence so it remains visible throughout the technical analysis ahead.

| REFERENCE              | TYPE   | WHY IT BELONGS HERE                                                      |
|------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Qur’an 21:25           | Verse  | Every messenger was sent with the call to worship Allāh alone.           |
| Qur’an 16:36           | Verse  | The prophetic call joins worship of Allāh with rejection of false gods.  |
| Qur’an 22:62           | Verse  | Allāh is the Truth; what is invoked besides Him is falsehood.            |
| Qur’an 37:35           | Verse  | The first hearers resisted the phrase because they understood its force. |
| Qur’an 47:19           | Verse  | The testimony must be known correctly, not merely uttered.               |
| Qur’an 3:18            | Verse  | The formula is framed as testimony grounded in knowledge.                |
| Jāmi‘ al-Tirmidhī 3383 | Hadith | The phrase is the best remembrance.                                      |
| Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn 917   | Hadith | It belongs to the believer’s final utterance.                            |

## Chapter 3 — Closing takeaway

These references are not decoration. Without them, the later analysis becomes a technical exercise detached from its purpose. The Qur'an and the Prophetic teaching have already established the governing reality: worship belongs to Allāh alone, false gods must be rejected, and the phrase carries consequence in life, devotion, and final speech.

The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, called it the best of remembrance. The hadīth tradition places it among the believer's final words. With this scriptural foundation in place, the sentence can now be examined as a whole — but the reader should never lose sight of what stands behind the grammar.



## Chapter 4 — The Sentence at a Glance: Structure, Fields, and Method


The testimony has two halves, and both are necessary. The first half — «لا إله» — negates. The second half — «إلا الله» — affirms. Understanding the testimony means understanding how these two halves work together: what kind of negation the first half performs, what kind of affirmation the second half delivers, and what sits between them that completes the sentence.

Four disciplines are needed to answer these questions: grammar tells us how the sentence is built; semantics tells us what the words carry; rhetoric tells us how the sentence delivers its force; and creed tells us what the sentence demands from the one who speaks it. This chapter maps the territory before the detailed analysis begins. The grammatical parsing (إعراب — i'rāb) of the Pure Word «لا إله إلا الله» requires reference to two chapters in Arabic grammar (النحو العربي — al-naḥw al-'arabī):

- The chapter on the particle that negates an entire category — known in Arabic as لا النافية للجنس (lā al-nāfiyah li-l-jins).
- The chapter on exception — known as الاستثناء (al-istithnā').

The first handles the parsing of the phrase «لا إله». The second handles the parsing of «إلا الله».

## The Testimony's Dual Structure



## Chapter 4 — Closing takeaway

The roadmap is now clear. The first half of the testimony — «لَا إِلَهَ» — is governed by the rules of categorical negation. The second half — «إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — is governed by the rules of exception. The work proceeds in that order: first the negative opening, then the exception, then the omitted predicate, the parse positions, the restriction mechanism, and the doctrinal synthesis.

The next chapter begins the grammatical analysis with the most fundamental question: what kind of negation does the first word perform?

## PART II — Grammar of the Formula

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## Chapter 5 — The First Half: “Lā Ilāha”

The first word of the testimony already determines the force of everything that follows. The question is not whether لا negates — every grammarian agrees that it does. The question is what kind of negation it performs.

Does it deny a single deity, leaving room for others? Or does it wipe out the entire category in one stroke, clearing the field completely before the exception names the One who remains?

The answer changes everything. If لا negates only one deity, the testimony is weak — it leaves the door open. If it negates the entire genus, the testimony is total — nothing survives the negation except what the exception explicitly rescues. This chapter shows that the لا in «لا إله» is the second kind: categorical, absolute, and without remainder.

### §5.1 — Real negation and lā al-tabri’ah

Al-Qārī states: “Lā is unambiguously a particle of negation — there is no disagreement on this point.”

This indicates a scholarly consensus among all grammarians who have parsed the Pure Word: every single one of them treats «لا» here as carrying genuine negative force. Not one of them, for instance, took it to be a semantically empty (pleonastic) particle — the way some scholars treat «لا» as superfluous in the Qur’anic verse:

«لَا أُقْسِمُ بِيَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ» (سورة القيامة: 1)

“I swear by the Day of Resurrection.” (Qur’an 75:1)

Nor does it function like the «لا» in the verse:

"So that the People of the Scripture may know." (Qur'an 57:29)

where «لَيْلًا» breaks down into «ل + أَنْ + لَا», and the underlying sense becomes “so that the People of the Scripture may know” — making the «لَا» emphatic rather than negating.

**The لا of disavowal.** In the technical terminology of the grammarians (النحاة — al-nuḥāh), this «لا» is called the “لا of disavowal” — in Arabic, لا التبرئة (lā al-tabri’ah). They reserve this designation exclusively for this particle, to the exclusion of all other negative particles.

Al-Azharī writes in his commentary on al-Taṣrīḥ: “Strictly speaking, the designation lā al-tabri’ah could apply to every negating lā, whatever its form, since every such particle clears the subject of what is being denied. Yet the grammarians reserved this name for the one that negates the whole genus because that is the construction in which complete disavowal appears most forcefully.”

The term tabri’ah is a specialized grammatical coinage. It does not retain its broader linguistic meaning. Otherwise, particles like لما, لن, لم, and إن would all qualify, since they all carry a sense of negation. Grammarians restricted the label to لا specifically when it negates an entire category — to distinguish it from the prohibitive (لا الناهية) and the simple negating (لا النافية). Why does this matter for the shahādah? Because if the لا in «لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» were anything other than categorical — if it were decorative, or emphatic, or limited to a single unit — the testimony would not do what monotheism requires. It would leave deities standing. The grammarians’ unanimous identification of this لا as total and genus-wide is what gives the first half of the testimony its power to sweep the field clean.

## §5.2 — What al-jins means here

The concept of genus — in Arabic, الجنس (al-jins) — may have entered Arabic grammar as a borrowing from logic (المنطق — al-mantīq), where it figures among the Five Universals (الكليات — al-kullīyyāt al-khams).

A genus is the universal predicated of many things that differ in their essential nature. الحيوان (animal), for instance, is predicated of the human being, the horse, and the donkey, and is true of all of them.

In brief: a genus is by nature inclusive. الحيوانية (animality) encompasses human beings and non-human beings alike. The differentiating characteristic (الفصل — al-faṣl) is what separates one from another — like rationality (النطقية — al-nuṭqīyyah), which distinguishes humans from the rest of the animals.

So when you say «لَا حَيَوَانَ فِي الدَّاخِلِ» — “there is no animal inside” — the meaning is the negation of the entire category of الحيوان from being inside. Everything whose essential nature includes animality (which in classical logic simply denotes a living, animate being) is negated: a horse, a bee, and even humans like Zayd and Bakr... and so on.

«لَا» negates the genus. This indicates that it operates with total generality (عموم — ‘umūm), definitively and unambiguously (نصاً لا احتمالاً — naṣṣan lā iḥtimālan).

The grammarians supply the preposition من (min — “of/from”) alongside it in their explanatory gloss (تقدير — taqdīr). So the underlying form of «لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» is: «لَا مِنْ إِلَهٍ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — “there is not a single deity of any kind except Allāh.”

al-Dasūqī explains: “The addition of min in a context of negation indicates the universality of that negation — because a single particle adds emphasis, and emphasis applied to negation yields generality.”

### §5.3 — Why this لَا resembles إِنَّ, and where the resemblance stops

This لَا belongs to the family of negative particles, yet it also has a connection to the emphatic particles. The grammarians call it “the لَا that operates grammatically like the emphatic إِنَّ (لَا) — العاملة عمل إِنَّ المشددة — lā al-‘āmilah ‘amal inna al-mushaddadah).

Abū al-Baqā’ explains the resemblance in four respects: each of them governs a nominal sentence; each serves the purpose of emphasis (لَا emphasizes negation, إِنَّ emphasizes affirmation); لَا is the counterpart of إِنَّ, and a thing may be compared to its counterpart; and each takes precedence at the head of the sentence.

However, لَا is merely analogous to إِنَّ — not identical to it. Its grammatical force is a degree below. The differences include: the noun governed by لَا must always be explicit and indefinite, while إِنَّ can govern pronouns and definite nouns; the predicate of لَا cannot precede its noun; the noun of لَا does not take tanwīn; and there is disagreement about whether the noun is inflected or

indeclinable. The لا in «لا إله» establishes the negation of all deities across the entire category. Its force is foundational — it does not reinforce a pre-existing negation the way إِنَّ reinforces an existing affirmation, but rather brings the negation into being. If any element of emphasis is attributed to it, this is only in the comparative sense that its negation is more decisive than that carried by weaker particles such as ما.

## §5.4 — The difference between genus negation and unit negation

It is essential to distinguish between two types of negation. The first negates the entire category at once — categorical negation (لا النافية للجنس — lā al-nāfiyah li-l-jins). The second negates only a single individual from the category — unit negation (لا النافية للوحدة — lā al-nāfiyah li-l-waḥdah).

‘Abbās Ḥasan explains in al-Naḥw al-Wāfi: “When we say «لَا كِتَابَ فِي الْحَقِيَّةِ» — ‘there is no book in the bag’ — the construction is open to two interpretations: the negation of a single book (while two or more might remain), or the negation of the entire species of books.”

The shahādah uses categorical negation. When you say لا إله, you are not saying “there is not one deity.” You are saying: nothing of the species “deity” remains — the entire category is wiped clean before the exception names the One who stands.

| TERM                                    | WORKING MEANING             | WHY IT MATTERS                       |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Categorical negation (لا النافية للجنس) | Negates the whole class     | Needed for the shahādah’s full scope |
| Unit negation (لا النافية للوحدة)       | Negates one individual only | Too weak for the testimony           |
| The لا of disavowal (لا التبرئة)        | Absolute disavowal          | Explains the force of total negation |

## §5.5 — The six conditions for لا to operate like إِنَّ

For لا to do what إِنَّ does grammatically — govern its noun and predicate — six conditions must be met:

1. لا must not be redundant (زائدة).
2. It must be negating the entire genus — not a single individual.
3. Its negation of the genus must be definitive (نصاً) — not merely a possibility.
4. It must not be followed by a conjunction with repetition of لا.
5. There must be no separator between لا and its noun.
6. Both the noun and predicate of لا must be indefinite.

All six conditions are met in the shahādah. The لا is genuine, the negation covers the entire genus, it is definitive, there is no conjunction, no separator intervenes, and both elements are indefinite.

## §5.6 — Is the noun of لا inflected or indeclinable?

Grammarians agree that لا governs its noun. They disagree on the nature of the fatḥa vowel that appears on it:

The view of al-Zajjāj and al-Sīrāfi: the fatḥa is an inflectional vowel — the noun remains grammatically inflected, but tanwīn is dropped because the noun is compounded with its governing particle.

The view of al-Mubarrad and al-Akhfash: the fatḥa is a constructional vowel — the noun is indeclinable, built on fatḥa the way compound numbers like **خَمْسَةُ عَشَرَ** are built.

Al-Raḍī preferred indeclinability: “The correct position is that it is indeclinable — because the noun has absorbed within itself the meaning of the comprehensive min.”

## Chapter 5 — Closing takeaway

Three things are now established, and each one matters for the testimony.



First: the لا in «لا إله» is a genuine particle of negation. It is not decorative, not emphatic in the non-negating sense, not filler. It negates.

Second: it negates the entire genus of deities — not one, not some, but all — explicitly and definitively, with the force of total disavowal. The grammarians call this لا التبرئة precisely because nothing survives it.

Third: it operates like لا in governing its noun and predicate, though under stricter conditions. These conditions are met in the shahādah, and their meeting is what allows the first half of the testimony to do its work.

The entire category is cleared. The question that follows is: what is the divine name that stands after the exception, and what does it carry?

## Chapter 6 — The Divine Name: “Allāh” as Form, Derivation, and Meaning

The divine name is not a side issue in this work. The meaning carried by the name Allāh shapes the force of the entire testimony. If the name means “the Creator” or “the Necessarily Existent,” the testimony leans toward ontology. If it means “the One worshipped,” the testimony stays centered on exclusive devotion. The derivation matters because it determines what the affirmation after the exception actually affirms.

This chapter examines the form of the name, the scholarly debate over its derivation, and the conclusion that best serves the testimony: Allāh is the One truly worthy of worship.

### Form of the name and the alif-lām question

«الله» is composed of «ال» and «إله». Sībawayh writes: “The origin of this name is that it should be ilāh, and its morphological pattern (وزن — wazn) is fi‘āl.”

A calligraphic observation is worth noting: the Pure Word consists of exactly two particles and two nouns — «لا» and «إله», «إلا» and «الله». It is as though the first particle «لا» had «ال» added to it to form the second particle «إلا», and the first noun «إله» had «ال» added to it to form the second noun «الله».

One might naturally assume that the «ال» prefixed to the name «الله» is the definite article (ال — al al-ta‘rīf). That assumption is incorrect.

Sībawayh writes: “The alif and lām are a substitute for the hamzah in ilāh.” His view is that the origin of «الله» is «إله» — and this is not a case of making an indefinite noun definite. The «ال» did not enter upon «إله» in order to define it; rather, the hamzah was dropped and the «ال» substituted for it.

Abū al-Baqā' al-'Ukbarī (أبو البقاء العكبري) explained the prohibition on attaching يا to a noun with ال in al-Lubāb, noting two reasons: first, «ال» is for definition, and يا already designates the addressee, making the two redundant; second, «ال» in «الله» is a substitute for the hamzah of «إله», so it converges with يا from that angle.

He concluded by pointing to **five features unique to the name «الله»**:

1. The permissibility of attaching يا to «الله» in vocative address (يا الله).
2. The emphatic pronunciation of its lām (التفخيم — tafkhīm), except when preceded by a kasrah.
3. The cutting of its hamzah (قطع — qaṭ') in vocative and oath contexts, as in «أفأله».
4. Its exclusive association with the oath particle تاء القسم (as in تالله).
5. The attachment of the letter mīm at its end: «اللهم» (allāhumma).

### Three views on the alif-lām

1. Ibn al-'Arabī al-Mālikī and his student al-Suhaylī held that the «ال» in «الله» is part of the word itself, permanently inseparable from the name. It can never be dropped under any circumstances. They classified the attested form «لاهِ أَبوك» as an irregular anomaly.
2. A third scholarly position treats the «ال» as the «ال» of predominance (للغلبة — li-l-ghalabah), assuming the original form was «الإله», since «إله» can refer to anything worshipped — rightfully or wrongfully — whereas «الله» can only refer to the One worshipped rightfully. In this way the name became like «النجم» (the star) for the Pleiades, «المدينة» (the city) for Medina, and «الكتاب» (the book) for Sībawayh's famous work.

This view is countered by the observation that the name «الله» was never applied broadly to all objects of worship and then later came to predominate for the One true God. A supporting argument is the Qur'anic verse: «هَلْ تَعْلَمُ لَهُ سَمِيًّا» (Maryam 19:65) — interpreted to mean “one sharing the same name,” i.e., no idol or created thing was ever called «الله». Al-Shawkānī records this interpretation in Fath al-Qadīr.

3. Ibn Mālik rejected both preceding views. He held that «الله» is one of those proper names whose coinage came together with «ال» from the outset — meaning its origin is neither «إله» nor

«الإله». He argued that «الله» and «الإله» differ in both form (لفظاً) and meaning (معنى), and he presented a detailed technical refutation of both derivational accounts based on four morphological objections:

- The second derivation requires transferring a vowel movement across two separate words in a fixed and obligatory manner, which has no parallel in Arabic grammar.
- It requires transferring the vowel of a hamzah onto a letter identical to what follows it, producing two consecutive identical voweled letters — heavier than simply pronouncing the hamzah after a sukūn.
- The letter that receives the transferred vowel is left unvoweled, amounting to a grammatical operation that achieves nothing.
- The letter that received the transferred vowel is then assimilated into what follows the hamzah, going against analogical reasoning.

## Derived or underived?

A group of scholars, described by Ibn Ḥayyān as “the majority,” held that the name is primitive and uncoined (مرتجل غير مشتق — *murtajal ghayr mushtaq*), meaning it was never derived from any other word. They split into those who said it is originally Arabic yet still uncoined, and those who said it is of non-Arabic origin. The name has cognates in other Semitic languages, but the evidence strongly favors an Arabic derivation. [See Endnote, Ch. 6, n. 1.]

Ibn al-Qayyim refuted the objection that derivation implies a material origin incompatible with divine eternity. In *Badā’i‘ al-Fawā’id*, he writes:

“There is no doubt that if derivation were meant in this sense, it would be false. But those who affirm derivation did not intend this meaning; it never even crossed their minds. What they meant is simply that the name points to a divine attribute — namely divinity (الإلهية — *al-ulūhiyyah*) — just as the rest of His Beautiful Names (الأسماء الحسنى) such as *العليم* and *القدير* do: they are derived from their verbal roots without question, yet they are eternal, and what is eternal has no material origin. So whatever answer you give concerning these names applies equally to those who affirm derivation in the name الله.”

He then clarified the true meaning of derivation: the contrast is not between an old form that was abandoned and a new one that came into use. Derivation means that the name corresponds to its

verbal root in both form and meaning — not that it was generated from that root the way a branch grows from a trunk.

## Major derivational views

1. The strongest view: «الله» is derived from the root «أَلِهَ» (alaha, with fatḥah on the lām, on the pattern of فَتَحَ): يَأْلُهُ إِلهَةً — meaning “he worshipped, he rendered worship.” Al-Ṣiḥāḥ records that Ibn ‘Abbās read the verse «وَيَذَرُكَ وَالْأَهْتَكَ» with kasrah on the hamzah, explaining it as “your worship” — saying that Pharaoh was the one being worshipped.

From this derivation also comes the line of the poet Ru’bah ibn al-‘Ajjāj:

للهِ دُرُ الْغَانِيَاتِ الْمُدَّةِ ... سَبَّحْنَ وَاسْتَرْجَعْنَ مِنْ تَأْلِهِ

(By God, how wondrous are those women who lingered — they glorified God and said “innā lillāh” on account of my devotion and worship.)

On this derivation, إِلَهٌ means: the worshipped one (المعبود — al-ma‘būd). The word-form «إِلَهٍ» is a resemblant adjective (صفة مشبهة — šifah mushabbahah). Its morphological pattern is «فَعَالٌ» and its meaning is that of a passive participle (مفعول — maf‘ūl). Analogous examples: «كِتَابٌ» (kitāb — “something written”), «فِرَاشٌ» (firāsh — “something spread out”), «حِسَابٌ» (ḥisāb — “something reckoned”).

This is the one most consistent with the Muslim creed. It keeps the distinction clear: «الرَّبُّ» (al-Rabb) is the Lord in the active sense — Creator, Provider, Sustainer. «اللهُ» (Allāh) is the One worshipped in the responsive sense — sought, directed toward, submitted to.

2. From «أَلِهَ» (aliha, with kasrah on the lām, on the pattern of فَرَحَ): “he was bewildered, confounded.” Hearts are struck with bewilderment when reflecting on the greatness of Allāh; minds are confounded in trying to comprehend the One being worshipped; intellects are dazzled. Al-Ālūsī criticized this view: the proper principle in derivation is that the derived quality should inhere in the subject of the name itself, yet bewilderment inheres in the creature, not in the Creator. However, the objection can be deflected by saying the intent is “the one toward whom bewilderment is directed.”

3. From «وَلِهَ» (walihā, with kasrah): the wāw was changed to a hamzah, giving «إِلِهَ». Al-walah means the loss of one's reason from the overwhelming intensity of longing. A she-camel is called wālih when her grief over her young becomes unbearable. Ibn al-Jawzī said: "It is derived from al-walah because the hearts of servants are overwhelmingly drawn toward Him in yearning — as in His words: «ثُمَّ إِذَا مَسَّكُمُ الضُّرُّ فَإِلَيْهِ تَجْأَرُونَ» — then when harm befalls you, it is to Him alone that you cry out."

A weakness: the expected plural would be «أُولَهَةٌ» not «آلَهَةٌ», and the conversion of the wāw into an alif without a conditioning vowel goes against analogical reasoning.

4. From «لَاهَ» (lāhā — "He rose high" or "He concealed Himself"): pointing to Allāh's absolute transcendence (الْعُلُوُّ — al-'uluww) and the utter incapacity of minds to visualize or imagine Him.

## Ibn 'Āshūr's synthesis

Ibn 'Āshūr synthesizes in al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr:

«اللَّهُ» is the name of the Necessarily Existent Divine Essence (الذات الواجب الوجود) deserving of all praise. The origin of this name is «الإِلَهَ» — the definite form of «إِلَهَ», which is a category noun (اسم جنس — ism jins) for the one worshipped — all of which trace back to a meaning intrinsically linked to submission and reverence. Its morphological pattern is «فَعَالٌ» with the meaning of a passive participle, like «كَتَابٌ». The Arabs applied it to all their idols and objects of worship because they regarded those things as genuinely worthy of worship — and that is why they pluralized it as «آلَهَةٌ».

He continues: "I believe that the name of Allāh Most High became established in the Arabic language before polytheism entered among the Arabs, and that its original coinage pointed to His unique and exclusive divinity (الألوهية — al-ulūhiyyah), since there is no god but Him. For this reason it became a proper name specifically for Him. This is not a case of a name becoming exclusive through predominance of use — rather it is a proper name through exclusive confinement (العَلَمُ بالانحصار), like «الشمس» (the sun) and «القمر» (the moon). We have found no evidence that the Arabs ever applied «الإِلَهَ» in its definite singular form to any one of their particular idols."

Why does the derivation matter? Because the first view — “he worshipped” — is the one most consistent with the Muslim creed. It keeps the distinction clear: **الرب** is the Lord in the active sense — Creator, Provider, Sustainer. **الله** is the One worshipped in the responsive sense — sought, directed toward, submitted to. The testimony affirms the second, not merely the first.

## Chapter 6 — Closing takeaway

The strongest and most widely supported derivation traces the name Allāh to the root meaning “he worshipped.” This makes **إله** mean “the one worshipped” and Allāh the proper name for the One who alone deserves that worship. The alif-lām is not the standard definite article — it is either a substitute for the original hamzah, or part of the name’s very coinage. The five unique features of the name confirm that it stands apart from every other noun in the Arabic language.

With the divine name’s meaning established, the work can now examine how the second half of the testimony — **«إلا الله»** — is constructed and what grammatical force it carries. The next chapter opens the exception.



## Chapter 7 — The Second Half: “Illā Allāh”

If the first half clears the ground, the second half identifies the One who remains. It does so through one of the most forceful constructions in Arabic: negation followed by exception. The particle **إِلَّا** (“except”) is the hinge of the entire testimony. Everything before it negates; everything after it affirms.

This chapter explains what exception means in Arabic grammar, whether **إِلَّا** is a simple or compound particle, and why the divine name after it takes the nominative case — which is the only form found in the Qur’an and the Prophetic hadith.

### What **إِلَّا** is, and whether it is simple or compound

«**إِلَّا**» is a particle of exception (أداة استثناء — *adāt istithnā*). As to its internal structure, linguists hold two positions.

**The first position (Sībawayh and the majority): its structure is simple (بسيطة — *basīṭah*).**

Sībawayh said: «**إِلَّا**» in the function of exception is like the word «**دَفْلَى**» (oleander — *daflā*). If you name someone with it, the person so named would not be grammatically declinable, whether in definite or indefinite contexts.” Al-Zajjāj explained his intent: “He means that «**إِلَّا**» is a single word of the feminine gender. The alif at its end is an alif of femininity, just like the alif in «**دَفْلَى**». That is why a person named with it would be indeclinable.”

The oleander analogy is precise. The word *daflā* is morphologically complete and indivisible. By comparing **إِلَّا** to it, Sībawayh establishes that **إِلَّا** is a single, structurally unified particle — not a fusion of two components.

**The second position (al-Farrā’): its structure is compound (مركبة — *murakkabah*).**

Al-Farrā’ held that «**إِلَّا**» is compounded from two particles: «**إِنْ**» and «**لَا**». His mechanism works as follows:



When لا causes the accusative, as in «جاء القومُ إلَّا زيدًا» — the particle causing the accusative is «إن», while «لا» is rendered null. The construction reads as if one said: «قام القومُ إنَّ زيدًا لا» — meaning: he did not stand. The contradiction implied by the context suffices as a predicate.

When لا gives a nominative reading, as in «قامَ القومُ إلَّا زيدٌ» — the particle giving the nominative is «لا», while «إن» is rendered null. The construction reads as if one said: «قامَ القومُ لا زيدٌ».

**Al-Zajjāj's demolition.** Abū al-Qāsim al-Zajjāj demonstrates the structural invalidity of al-Farrā's position in al-Lāmāt:

“This is arbitrary and capricious on al-Farrā's part. Rendering «إن» null and void while beginning with it is something unheard of in Arabic with no parallel — because the Arabs have universally agreed that a nullified particle cannot begin a sentence. It is not permissible to say ظننتُ زيدٌ on the basis of nullifying «ظننتُ» while beginning with it. Likewise the position of «إن» in «إلَّا» — if it were compound as he claims — would make it impermissible to nullify it, and the nominative reading would be an error, since «إن» comes first.

“Yet all the Arabs and all the grammarians agree on the permissibility of «ما قام القومُ إلَّا زيدٌ» — and the word of Allāh Most High: «مَا فَعَلُوهُ إِلَّا قَلِيلٌ مِنْهُمْ» — and the nominative here demonstrates the structural invalidity of al-Farrā's position.”

Al-Zajjāj further notes that al-Farrā' also permitted the nominative after لا in an affirmative context, saying “I raise it by nullifying «إن» and by coordination with «لا».” He responds: “I have explained to you the structural invalidity of this view; it is a grammatical error according to the Basran school.”

## Why the nominative became the dominant reading

Scholars have allowed both the nominative (الرفع — al-raf') and the accusative (النصب — al-naṣb) for the divine name following لا. However, the nominative is preferred for two reasons: it is consistently and uniformly used throughout the Qur'an, and the majority of the grammarians favor it.

Dr. Ḥasan Mūsā al-Shā‘ir concludes: “The nominative of the noun following لا is the predominant standard in the language — indeed, it is the only form found in the Qur’an and the Prophetic hadīth. As for the accusative, it occurs in some lines of poetry but rarely.”

## What exception means in grammar

Exception in Arabic extracts one element from a larger group and assigns it a ruling contrary to the rest. Three types matter here:

| TYPE                   | ARABIC TERM           | USE IN THIS WORK                                                                     |
|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Connected exception    | المتصل (al-muttaṣil)  | The excepted element remains within the same class                                   |
| Disconnected exception | المنفصل (al-munfaṣil) | The excepted element is outside the original class                                   |
| Stripped exception     | المفرغ (al-mufarragh) | The governing force reaches beyond لا because the earlier slot is not fully occupied |

The third type — stripped exception — becomes critical in Chapter 9, where the predicative analysis depends on it.

Why does the nominative matter? Because it keeps the divine name in its strongest grammatical position. In the accusative, the name is merely an excepted element — extracted from the group. In the nominative, it is either a substitute standing in the place of what was negated, or the predicate that completes the sentence. Both carry more grammatical weight. And a formula whose every Qur’anic attestation uses the nominative should be read in the nominative.

## Chapter 7 — Closing takeaway

Two things are now established about the exception construction. First: لا is a simple particle of exception — the compound analysis does not survive al-Zajjāj’s demolition. Sibawayh’s oleander analogy confirms that لا is structurally unified and indivisible. Second: the nominative of the divine name after لا is the only form found in the Qur’an and hadīth. The accusative appears in poetry but rarely.

With these settled, the decisive question emerges: what happened to the predicate of لا? The testimony says «لا إله إلا الله» — but where is the word that completes the predication? That question is the subject of the next chapter, and it is the most consequential grammatical question in the entire study.

## Chapter 8 — Where Is the Predicate?

The testimony is grammatically incomplete. It has a subject — “deity” (إله) — but no predicate. No word finishes the thought. Arabic grammar requires one. The question is: what word should be mentally supplied to complete the sentence?

This turns out to be the most consequential grammatical question in the entire study. The word you supply changes the meaning of the shahādah.

Supply “exists” (موجود — maujūd), and you get: “There is no existing deity except Allāh.” That is a statement about ontology. Supply “rightfully worshipped” (معبود بحق — ma’būd bi-ḥaqq), and you get: “There is no deity rightfully worshipped except Allāh.” That is a statement about exclusive worship. The difference is enormous. The first is something even the polytheists of Mecca would have accepted. The second is what they killed to resist.

### Why the omitted predicate became the pivotal question

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī attempted to solve the problem by refusing to supply any predicate at all. His reasoning: every supplied predicate narrows the negation and weakens the universality of tawḥīd. As a master of scholastic theology (kalām), al-Rāzī feared that supplying any predicate might inadvertently limit God’s absolute transcendence or grant theoretical reality to false gods. If one infers maujūd, the negation seems to apply only to currently existing deities, leaving the door open to possible deities in non-existence. [See Endnote, Ch. 12, n. 1 for al-Rāzī’s full theological motivation.]

The grammarians showed that this fear is unfounded. To negate the existence of all deities other than Allāh is not to qualify the negation — because non-existence is not a qualification at all. What does not exist is nothing, and nothing is not a candidate for deity. Furthermore, dispensing with the predicate entirely is not viable in Arabic: a subject must have a predicate, and communicative benefit requires a complete attributive relation.

**Qur’anic control.** Three passages keep this discussion from drifting: Qur’an 21:25 ties the message of every messenger to worship of Allāh alone; Qur’an 16:36 pairs worship of Allāh with rejection of false gods; and Qur’an 22:62 distinguishes the True One from what is invoked besides Him as false.

| PROPOSED PREDICATE                  | WHAT IT PRESERVES        | MAIN WEAKNESS                               | JUDGMENT      |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------|
| مَوْجُودٌ — existing                | Breadth of negation      | Slips toward lordship language              | Not strongest |
| مُمْكِنٌ — possible                 | Wider abstract scope     | Does not clearly carry the full affirmation | Not strongest |
| مَوْجُودٌ وَمُمْكِنٌ                | Both concerns            | Overextended ellipsis                       | Weak          |
| حَقٌّ / بِحَقِّ / مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقِّ | Worship-centered meaning | Needs careful explanation                   | Strongest     |

## Why the stronger reading is the worship-centered family

The fuller range of representative scholarly support for the worship-centered reading — from al-Qurṭubī, al-Zamakhsharī, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Rajab, al-Biqā’ī, and al-Ṭībī — is gathered in Chapter 11. Here it is enough to note that major scholars across grammar, tafsīr, and creed accepted the worship-centered meaning even when they differed over the exact wording. This is where grammar meets creed. The word you supply in the gap is not a neutral linguistic choice. It determines whether the shahādah is a statement about who exists or a demand about who deserves worship. The Qur’an’s own way of handling false gods — calling them “falsehood” (الباطل), not “non-existent” — governs the answer. The testimony does not report ontology. It pronounces a verdict.

## Chapter 8 — Closing takeaway

A predicate must be inferred. Al-Rāzī's attempt to dispense with one altogether does not survive the grammarians' rebuttal. Among the proposals, the worship-centered family — “rightful,” “rightfully,” “rightfully worshipped” (حق / بحق / معبود بحق) — is strongest because it completes the grammar without shifting the testimony away from exclusive worship.

The next question is: what grammatical role does the divine name itself play after لا؟ That is the subject of Chapter 9.

## Chapter 9 — The Grammatical Positions of the Divine Name After “Illā”

The predicate question is settled. Now another follows: once the sentence is treated as grammatically complete, what role should be assigned to the divine name after لا! This is not a minor refinement. It affects how the affirmation stands after the initial negation.

Of the many reported parse positions, only two deserve sustained attention. The rest are recorded for scholarly completeness but do not carry the sentence as well.

| POSITION                             | WHAT IT MAKES “ALLĀH”                          | WEIGHT                         |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Substitution (البدل — al-badal)      | Apposition for the deleted predicate’s pronoun | Serious live option            |
| Predicate (الخبرية — al-khabariyyah) | The predicate itself                           | Serious live option            |
| Accusative by exception              | Excepted element                               | Allowed in theory, but weaker  |
| Descriptive (صفة with لا = غير)      | Adjectival reading                             | Technically possible, but weak |

### The substitution analysis (al-badal)

**Claim:** The predicate of لا is deleted. The divine name is a substitute (بدل — badal) for the pronoun in that deleted predicate. (Note: In Arabic grammar, derived adjectives like “worshipped”

[ma'būd] naturally contain a hidden pronoun [huwa / "he"] referring back to the subject. It is this hidden pronoun that the divine name substitutes for.)

Ibn Hishām states: "This grammatical analysis is well-known in the works of a group of the greatest authorities of this discipline. It has been said that the earlier grammarians and the majority of the later ones unanimously adopted it."

Nāẓir al-Jaysh adds: "This is also the grammatical analysis of Ibn Mālik. For when he discussed the deletion of the predicate of لا النافية للجنس, he said: 'The Hijazis delete it most frequently when لا is present — as in لا إله إلا الله.'"

**Three sub-positions on what exactly is substituted for.** The grammarians agreed that the divine name is ابدل in the nominative. They disagreed on which element it substitutes for:

1. «الله» substitutes for the grammatical position of «لا» together with its noun — i.e., the compound subject.
2. «الله» substitutes for the grammatical position of the noun of «لا» before لا entered the sentence — i.e., the original subject.
3. «الله» substitutes for the implied pronoun (الضمير المستتر — al-ḍamīr al-mustatir) within the deleted predicate.

The third position was not mentioned by Ibn Hishām, yet Nāẓir al-Jaysh preferred it for two reasons. First: the implied pronoun is closer in proximity to the substitute than the subject is, and substituting from what is closer is preferable. Second: substituting from the pronoun is a following based on the actual wording (اتباع باعتبار اللفظ — ittibā' bi-'tibār al-lafẓ), which is preferable to following based on the grammatical position (اتباع باعتبار المحل).

**Objection 1:** The pronoun is a particular (جزئي — juz'ī). How can exception be made from a particular?

**Response (al-Dasūqī):** "The substitution is valid here because the pronoun refers back to «إله» whose negation is comprehensive (مستغرق — mustaghriq). This comprehensiveness makes its referent general in what it denotes, which is what makes exception from it valid."

**Objection 2:** How can the affirmative be a substitute for the negated? The ordinary meaning of ابدل is that one thing stands in place of another, requiring similarity. What could be further from




standing in place of something than its very opposite? Furthermore, بدل البعض (substitution of a part) requires a referring pronoun back to the substituted-for element. Where is that pronoun?

**Response:** Two answers have been given. First: the referring pronoun is required only when there is a risk that the second element might be taken as a fresh start (استئناف — isti'nāf). The particle لا itself serves the linking function. It binds the substitute to the original element and prevents the misunderstanding that a new sentence has begun. Nāẓir al-Jaysh states: “لا and what follows it are part of the completion of the first statement. لا is itself a contextual marker” — making a separate pronoun unnecessary.

Second: agreement is required in the governing element’s grammatical effect (عمل العامل — ‘amal al-‘āmil), not in semantic content. The negation is cancelled by لا.

**Syntax diagram — the substitution analysis:**



## The predicative analysis (al-khabariyyah)

**Claim:** The divine name is the predicate (خبر — khabar) of the compound subject formed by لا and its noun together.

Nāẓir al-Jaysh states: “As for the view that the exalted name is in the nominative as a predicate — a group of scholars have held this, and it appears to me to be more sound than the view of substitution.”

**The predication core.** The predicative analysis reduces the testimony to an underlying nominal sentence: «الإلهُ اللهُ» — “the deity is Allāh.” Here «الإلهُ» is the subject and «اللهُ» is the predicate. Both are definite. This is unusual, because the standard rule is that the predicate should be indefinite — carrying new information the listener does not yet possess. If both subject and predicate are definite, the sentence becomes a statement of identity, which seems redundant.

But the intent here is not to inform the listener that Allāh is a deity. The polytheists already believed that. The intent is to inform that divinity is confined exclusively to Allāh. There is a vast difference between the two.

Consider an analogy: «القرآنُ كتابٌ» — “The Qur’an is a book” — is said to someone who does not yet know what the Qur’an is. But «القرآنُ الكتابُ» — “The Qur’an is the Book” — is said to someone who already knows it is a book but needs to understand that it is confined to being what was revealed, nothing else. The definiteness of both subject and predicate conveys confinement, not description. That is exactly what the testimony does.

**How لا entered the sentence.** Al-Dasūqī explains: “The underlying original sentence is «الإلهُ اللهُ» — with «الإلهُ» as subject and «اللهُ» as predicate. Then «لا» entered and took over the subject, turning it into its noun. Since the sentence before «لا» entered already conveyed confinement — by virtue of both subject and predicate being definite — «إلا» had to be introduced when «لا» entered, to preserve that confinement.”

On this reading, «إله» is the noun of «لا», and «إلا اللهُ» is the predicate of the compound subject formed by «لا» together with its noun. No separate predicate is deleted.

**The rhetorical objection:** Treating «إلا اللهُ» as the predicate fails to match the declaration to the demands of the situation. The polytheists believed in the divinity of Allāh; they did not believe in

Him alone. The Pure Word must negate the deservingness of worship from everything other than Allāh and affirm it for Allāh alone. On the predicative reading, what is conveyed is only the negation of Allāh's being different from every deity — not the affirmation of His exclusive right.

**Response:** The generality has been negated. The construction confines the predicate to one individual from what the general expression denoted. The polytheists' dispute was not about Allāh's existence as a deity but about exclusive restriction. The predicative reading delivers exactly that restriction — through the mechanism of stripped exception (الاستثناء المفرغ — al-istithnā' al-mufarragh), where لا is bypassed and the governing force reaches directly to the divine name.

**Grammatical objection 1:** لا النافية للجنس governs only indefinite nouns. The divine name is definite.

**Response:** The predicate is not governed by لا directly. On Sībawayh's view, لا does not govern the predicate at all. Once لا merges with its noun into a compound, its governing force weakens. The compound «لا» + noun functions as a subject, and the predicate that follows remains free and ungoverned by لا — standing in the nominative by virtue of the original predication relationship, not by لا's governance.


**Grammatical objection 2:** The predicative analysis entails that the divine name is simultaneously the excepted element (المستثنى) and the predicate. But the excepted element must differ from the element from which it is excepted (المستثنى منه), since its role is to clarify what was intended. A thing cannot clarify itself.

**Response:** In stripped exception, the mechanism works differently. The excepted element is not being extracted from a complete prior set. Rather, the prior set is incomplete — and the element after لا completes it as its predicate. The roles of “excepted” and “predicate” do not collapse into a contradiction because they operate on different grammatical planes.

**Grammatical objection 3:** The predicative analysis entails predicating the specific (الخاص — al-khāṣṣ) of the general (العام — al-‘āmm). One cannot say «الحيوان إنسان» (“the animal is a human being”) — because the predicate is narrower than the subject.

**Response:** The generality has been negated. The sentence was not constructed to describe the category “deity” with a property it does not possess. It was constructed to deny the category entirely and then confine what remains to one individual. The negation wipes the category clean before the predicate identifies the One who fills it.

## Syntax diagram — the predicative analysis:



Why does the predicative analysis matter theologically? Because Nāẓir al-Jaysh argued that only this parsing yields the meaning of monotheism by unanimous agreement across all legal-theoretical schools. The substitution and accusative-exception analyses produce restriction only on the doctrine of those who accept that exception from negation yields affirmation — a principle the Ḥanafī school, which strictly limits implied opposite meanings (مفهوم المخالفة — *mafhūm al-mukhālafah*), does not accept. The predicative analysis treats the construction as stripped exception, in which لَا is bypassed and the governing force reaches directly to the divine name. This mechanism yields restriction unanimously. On this reasoning, the predicative analysis is not

merely the more parsimonious parsing — it is the parsing that secures monotheism for every Muslim who utters the declaration.

## The weak parsing: **إلا** meaning “other than”

**Claim:** «إلا الله» is an adjectival phrase meaning “other than Allāh.”

**Objection (doctrinal):** This delivers only the negation side. The affirmation of Allāh’s divinity depends on the weaker mode of implied meaning (المفهوم — al-mafhūm). And a testimony that requires both negation and affirmation should not leave the affirmation to the weaker mode.

## Chapter 9 — Closing takeaway

The parsing discussion yields two serious live positions — substitution and predicative analysis — alongside weaker alternatives preserved for completeness. Both live positions serve the worship-centered meaning of the testimony. The substitution analysis is the majority position, adopted by the earlier grammarians and most of the later ones. The predicative analysis is preferred by Nāẓir al-Jaysh because it secures restriction universally, without depending on a disputed mechanism. Both converge on the same doctrinal result: Allāh alone possesses the attribute of true divinity.

But parsing alone does not explain how the sentence delivers its total force. The question now shifts from what role the divine name plays to how the restriction mechanism works: whether the affirmation of Allāh’s exclusive divinity is carried by explicit statement, by implication, or by both together. That is the territory of the next chapter, where grammar meets rhetoric and legal theory.

**PART III — Restriction, Theology, and  
Synthesis**

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## Chapter 10 — Restriction, Explicit Wording, Implied Meaning, and Rhetorical Force

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The grammar is now settled. The parsing is weighed. But a new question appears: how does the sentence actually deliver its force?

It is one thing to say that the testimony negates and excepts. It is another to ask whether the affirmation for Allāh is carried by the words themselves — explicitly — or by what the words leave unsaid. This chapter is where grammar meets legal theory. It deals with a concept called restriction (ḥaṣr — الحصر): the mechanism by which the testimony strips a right from everything in existence and assigns it to one entity alone.

By the end of this chapter, the reader will know that the testimony functions as total restriction regardless of which legal-theoretical school one follows — and that even the Ḥanafī doctrine, which poses the strongest challenge to the formula’s signification, accommodates the full force of monotheism when read in its proper context.

### The terminology: explicit meaning vs. implied meaning

Before entering the debate, two terms must be understood. They come from the science of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh — أصول الفقه), and they determine how much weight a text carries.

The first is explicit meaning — what the wording directly states at the point of utterance. Arabic legal theorists call this المنطوق (al-manṭūq). If a Prophetic text says, “Zakāh is obligatory on grazing sheep,” the explicit meaning is that grazing sheep are taxed.

The second is implied meaning — what the wording indicates without directly stating it. Arabic legal theorists call this المفهوم (al-mafhūm). Looking at that same text, one infers that non-grazing (stall-fed) sheep are not taxed, even though the text never mentions them. That inference is the implied meaning.

There are subcategories. Implication by mere naming (مفهوم اللقب — mafhūm al-laqaḅ) — tying a ruling to nothing more than a bare name — is extremely weak. The legal theorists gave it no weight at all. Implication by attribute (مفهوم الصفة — mafhūm al-ṣifah) — tying a ruling to a descriptive quality — is a matter of scholarly disagreement.

Why does this matter? Because the testimony's affirmation of Allāh's exclusive divinity must be carried by the strongest mode of signification available. If it depends on the weaker mode — implication — then scholars who reject implied meaning would have no basis for the affirmation. And a formula as central as the shahādah cannot afford to rest on contested ground.

## Why the predicative parsing becomes doctrinally necessary

This is where the parsing debate from Chapter 9 returns with theological force.

Nāẓir al-Jaysh argued that only the predicative parsing (al-khabariyyah) yields restriction by unanimous agreement. His reasoning: the substitution and accusative-exception analyses produce restriction only on the doctrine of those who accept that exception from negation yields affirmation. The Ḥanafī school — which strictly limits the use of implied opposite meanings (مفهوم المخالفة — mafhūm al-mukhālafah) — does not accept this. The shahādah must signify monotheism for every Muslim without exception. Therefore the parsing that yields universal restriction must be preferred.

Nāẓir al-Jaysh summarized: “It is determined that «إلا» in this construction is deployed for the purpose of affirming for what follows it what was negated before it. This cannot be achieved unless what precedes it is incomplete — and it can only be incomplete if no deleted predicate is supplied before «إلا». And if no predicate is supplied before it, then what comes after it must necessarily be the predicate.”

## Explicit or implied? The legal theorists' debate over restriction

The legal theorists disagreed on how to classify restriction by «إلا ... لا». The majority held that it belongs to implied meaning (al-mafhūm). A minority — including al-Qarāfī and al-Shīrāzī — held that it belongs to explicit meaning (al-mantūq).



Al-Shawkānī records the debate and sides with the majority: “The strongest subtype is the «ما-«إلا» construction... The majority held that it falls under المفهوم, and this is the stronger view.”

But the practical consequence of this disagreement is smaller than it appears. Both sides agree that the formula delivers total restriction. The disagreement is about which mode of signification carries that restriction — not about whether the restriction itself is present.

## The Ḥanafī challenge — and how it was resolved

The Ḥanafī doctrine of exception posed a more serious challenge. On the Ḥanafī view, exception works by clarification (البيان — al-bayān): the opening statement applies to some of its individuals, namely those other than the excepted element. The excepted element itself is simply passed over in silence. No ruling is made about it.

If that is correct, then the shahādah would negate false deities but say nothing about Allāh’s divinity — it would leave Allāh’s side of the testimony unaddressed. How can the declaration of monotheism fail to declare monotheism?

Consider a concrete analogy: in linguistic Arabic, the word for prayer — ṣalāh (صلاة) — simply means “supplication.” In canonical usage (al-‘urf al-shar‘ī — العرف الشرعي), the law elevated it to mean the specific ritual prayer with its defined postures, recitations, and conditions. The linguistic meaning did not disappear — it was absorbed into a richer canonical meaning. In the same way, the Ḥanafī scholars argue, the shahādah’s signification in the sharī‘ah exceeds what the bare linguistic rule of exception yields. Just as ṣalāh evolved beyond its linguistic root, the shahādah evolved canonically to mean total exclusive restriction.

The Ḥanafī scholars addressed the challenge from two angles:

**First angle:** The declaration was constructed to resolve the actual dispute with the polytheists. The polytheists did not dispute that Allāh is a deity. They disputed the exclusive singularity of His claim. The declaration makes explicit the negation of rivals — that is its supreme purpose — while Allāh’s divinity, being agreed upon by both parties, does not need explicit affirmation.

**Second angle:** Shift from linguistic convention to canonical usage. The declaration’s signification in the sharī‘ah is broader than what the bare linguistic rule yields, just as the signification of ṣalāh, ṣawm, and ḥajj carry different denotations in canonical law than in linguistic convention.

Both angles preserve the declaration's monotheistic force without abandoning the Ḥanafī methodology. Neither weakens the rule. Both show that the methodology can accommodate the full force of tawḥīd when read in its proper context.

## Chapter 10 — Closing takeaway

The restriction debate resolves into a practical consensus. The formula functions as total restriction in service of monotheism — regardless of whether one classifies that restriction as explicit or implied, and regardless of whether one follows the Ḥanafī doctrine or the majority's doctrine. Even on the most restrictive view of what exception signifies, the declaration achieves its purpose when read against its canonical context.

With the grammatical, rhetorical, and legal-theoretical dimensions now in place, the work can state directly what the testimony negates and what it affirms. That is the subject of the next chapter.

## Chapter 11 — Ulūhiyyah, Worship, and What the Testimony Actually Negates and Affirms

Everything in this study has been building toward a single question: what exactly does the word “deity” (إِلَه — ilāh) mean in this testimony, and what is being denied from everything besides Allāh?

If the term is reduced to “the one who exists” or “the lord who creates and sustains,” the force of the testimony is thinned in a way the Qur’an does not permit. The polytheists already admitted that Allāh creates and sustains. What they refused was His exclusive right to worship.

The strongest interpretation is the one that keeps the issue where revelation places it: exclusive worship. This chapter states the case.

### The worship-centered reading

The inference revolves around the concept of rightful deservingness of worship (استحقاق العبادة — istiḥqāq al-‘ibādah). The wording may vary without changing the governing meaning:

- «لَا إِلَهَ حَقٌّ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — “There is no deity of right but Allāh.”
- «لَا إِلَهَ بِحَقٍّ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — “There is no deity rightfully but Allāh.”
- «لَا إِلَهَ يَسْتَحِقُّ الْعِبَادَةَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — “There is no deity that deserves to be worshipped but Allāh.”
- «لَا إِلَهَ مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقٍّ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — “There is no deity rightfully worshipped but Allāh.”

Under this reading, إِلَه means “the one worshipped” (المعبود — al-ma‘būd). The testimony does not merely deny that other gods exist. It denies that anything besides Allāh has the right to be worshipped — even if people do in fact worship it.

The Qur’an governs this point directly:

ذَلِكَ بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الْحَقُّ وَأَنَّ مَا يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ هُوَ الْبَاطِلُ» (سورة الحج: 62)

”That is because Allāh — He is the Truth. And what they invoke besides Him — that is falsehood.”  
(Qur’an 22:62)

Notice: the Qur’an does not say that what they invoke does not exist. It says it is false. The false gods named in Qur’an 71:23 — Wadd, Suwā’, Yaghūth, Ya‘ūq, Nasr — existed as objects of worship. But they were void of rightful claim. The testimony negates legitimacy, not bare existence.

This is why the worship-centered predicate is stronger than “exists.” The Qur’an’s own way of handling false gods — calling them falsehood (الباطل), not non-existent — governs the answer. The testimony does not report ontology. It pronounces a verdict.

## The distinction that protects the testimony

Two concepts must be kept separate. They are often confused, and the confusion weakens the testimony’s force:

|                                   | WORTHINESS OF WORSHIP<br>(الْأُلُوهِيَّة — AL-ULŪHIYYAH) | LORDSHIP (الرِّيْبِيَّة — AL-RUBŪBIYYAH)         |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Core meaning                      | The right to be worshipped                               | Creating, sustaining, governing                  |
| Main dispute with the polytheists | Yes — this is what they refused                          | Universally admitted by the Meccan polytheists   |
| Why it matters                    | Keeps the testimony centered on exclusive worship        | Too thin if treated as the whole meaning of ilāh |

The polytheists admitted lordship (rubūbiyyah). They did not object to Allāh as Creator. What they objected to was singling Him out alone for worship — granting Him exclusive ulūhiyyah. That is precisely what the testimony demands.

## Representative scholarly support

- Al-Qurṭubī: “Lā ilāha illā Allāh means: there is no object of worship but Him.”

- Al-Zamakhsharī: “Ilāh is a category noun that applies to every object of worship, whether worshipped rightfully or wrongfully; then, by predominance, it came to be used for the True One.”
- Ibn Taymiyyah: “The ilāh is the object of worship that is obeyed; the one who deserves worship is the one toward whom hearts turn in love, fear, hope, reliance, and surrender.”
- Ibn Rajab: “The ilāh is the one who is obeyed and never defied — out of awe, reverence, love, fear, hope, reliance, asking, and calling upon Him. None of this is fitting except for Allāh.”
- Al-Ṭībī: “Ilāh is on the pattern fi‘āl with the meaning of maf‘ūl, like kitāb in the sense of what is written; it is derived from alaha ilāhatan, meaning he worshipped with worship.”

The principle that Allāh alone deserves worship is affirmed across the major theological traditions named in this study — Mu‘tazilite, Rāfiḍī, Zaydī, Ash‘arī, and Salafī — even where they differ over grammatical framing or kalām vocabulary.

## A modern teaching summary

Ibn ‘Uthaymīn shows how the classical conclusion reaches the student in plain language:

“The meaning of «لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» is: there is no rightful object of worship but Allāh. As for the objects of worship besides Him — the divinity ascribed to them by their worshippers is not a true divinity; it is a false divinity. The true and rightful divinity belongs to Allāh alone.”

## Chapter 11 — Closing takeaway

The testimony negates the legitimacy of every object of worship besides Allāh and affirms that Allāh alone deserves worship in truth. False gods may exist as worshipped objects in history and society, but they do not possess true divinity. The Qur’an governs this distinction: Allāh is al-Ḥaqq, and what is invoked besides Him is al-Bāṭil.

What emerges is not merely a scholarly consensus on wording, but a demand: whoever utters the testimony is committing to exclusive worship, rejecting every rival claim, and submitting to Allāh as the sole rightful object of devotion, love, fear, and hope. The synthesis that follows gathers everything the work has established and states the final unified meaning.

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## Chapter 12 — Guided Synthesis

This is the summit of the book. Every thread that was followed through revelation, grammar, rhetoric, and creed now converges here. The question is no longer “what does this sentence mean?” but “how do all the answers fit together — and what do they produce?”

The testimony means: there is no true object of worship except Allāh. This chapter shows why that conclusion is not a simplification but a synthesis — the product of ten chapters of analysis, not a shortcut past them.

### What grammar clarified

Grammar established two things without which the testimony cannot function.

First: the لا in «لا إله» is categorical negation — the type that wipes out the entire genus of deities, not merely one individual. This was the unanimous position of every grammarian who parsed the Pure Word (Chapter 5). The grammarians’ explanatory gloss supplies the preposition *min* to make that universality explicit, so that «لا إله» is understood as «لا من إله» — not a single deity of any kind.

Second: the divine name after لا takes the nominative — the only form found in the Qur’an and the Prophetic hadīth (Chapter 7). The nominative keeps the divine name in its strongest grammatical position: either as a substitute standing in the place of what was negated, or as the predicate that completes the sentence (Chapter 9).

The predicative analysis carries additional theological weight. Nāẓir al-Jaysh argued that only this parsing yields monotheism by unanimous agreement across all legal-theoretical schools, because it treats the construction as stripped exception — in which لا is bypassed and the governing force reaches directly to the divine name. This mechanism yields restriction unanimously, regardless of one’s uṣūlī position on exception (Chapter 10).

These grammatical facts create the backbone of the testimony: a total negation of the genus followed by an affirmation in the nominative. Everything that follows rests on this backbone.

## What the inferred predicate had to do

The testimony omits its predicate. That omission is not a defect. It is a feature of Arabic eloquence that the grammarians addressed by inferring what completes the sentence. But the choice of inferred predicate is not neutral. It shapes the meaning (Chapter 8).

Al-Rāzī tried to avoid the problem entirely by refusing to supply any predicate. As a master of *kalām*, he feared that any supplied predicate might limit God's transcendence. The grammarians showed that this fear is unfounded — because non-existence is not a qualification, and dispensing with the predicate violates the law of Arabic sentence structure.

Among the proposals, three received sustained attention: “existing” (مَوْجُودٌ), “possible” (مُمْكِنٌ), and the worship-centered family (حَقٌّ / مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقِّ). The first two are not without merit, but both drift toward ontological and lordship language that thins the Qur'anic force of the declaration. The worship-centered family is strongest because it preserves the grammar, serves the breadth of negation, and remains centered on worship. The principle that Allāh alone deserves worship is affirmed across the major theological traditions named in this study, even where they differ over *kalām* vocabulary.

## What rhetoric made unmistakable

The testimony does not merely state something. It restricts something. It takes the right to be worshipped, strips it from everything in existence, and assigns it to Allāh alone. Arabic rhetoricians call this exclusive confinement — *al-ḥaṣr* (الحصر). The «...إلا» construction is one of the most powerful tools in the Arabic language for delivering this kind of total restriction (Chapter 10).

The Ḥanafī challenge — that exception as clarification yields no affirmation — was resolved from two angles: the declaration addresses the point of contention (negation of rivals), and canonical usage exceeds the bare linguistic rule. Both angles preserve the testimony's monotheistic force without abandoning the Ḥanafī methodology.



## What revelation made decisive

The synthesis has moved from grammar through rhetoric not because revelation comes last in authority, but because it comes over all. The Qur’anic evidence does not merely add one more thread to the argument; it governs every thread that preceded it. The work began with revelation in Chapters 3 and 4. The synthesis ends with it here because it is the decisive authority.

Three passages anchor the meaning. Qur’an 21:25 establishes that every messenger was sent with the call to worship Allāh alone — making the testimony the universal message. Qur’an 16:36 pairs worship of Allāh with rejection of false gods — showing that the testimony’s two halves mirror the prophetic call itself. And Qur’an 22:62 distinguishes the True One from what is invoked besides Him as falsehood — showing that the Qur’an denies rival deities by the qualification of truth, not existence.

The Qur’an’s own way of handling false gods is not to say they do not exist. It says they are *bāṭil*: void, null, devoid of rightful claim. That is exactly the force of the worship-centered predicate. The testimony pronounces a verdict: everything worshipped besides Allāh is false, and Allāh alone is true.

## What competing readings preserved before failing

The weaker readings are not worthless. Each tried to protect something real — but each became weaker at the exact point where it drifted away from the worship-centered meaning governed by the Qur’an.

The inference of “existing” tried to protect the broadest scope of negation — but drifted toward lordship language. The inference of “possible” tried to extend the negation into the conceivable — but could not clearly affirm Allāh’s divinity without supplementary reasoning. The accusative reading tried to preserve the standard exception construction — but is not the reading found in the Qur’an. The adjectival reading tried to deliver negation without an inferred predicate — but left the affirmation to the weaker mode of implied meaning.

## The final unified meaning

The testimony «لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» means: **there is no true object of worship except Allāh.**

«لا» negates the entire genus of deities — every claimed, imagined, inherited, or fabricated object of worship — with the force of total disavowal.

The inferred predicate is **حَقٌّ** or **مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقِّ** — so the full underlying form is: there is no deity rightfully worshipped except Allāh.

«إِلا الله» stands in the nominative and affirms that Allāh alone possesses the attribute of true divinity.

The formula operates as total restriction: it strips the right to worship from everything in existence and confines it to Allāh alone.

The Qur'an governs this reading at every level: the universal prophetic call (21:25), the pairing of worship with rejection of false gods (16:36), the distinction between the True and the false (22:62), and the resistance of the first hearers who understood exactly what the testimony demanded of them (37:35).

Whoever says this testimony with knowledge, truthfulness, and surrender is doing four things at once: negating every false object of worship, affirming Allāh's exclusive right to worship, pronouncing a verdict of falsehood on all rival claims, and committing to a life aligned with that verdict in belief, word, and deed.

## Chapter 12 — Closing takeaway

This is the meaning the work set out to recover. Grammar clarified its structure. The predicate inquiry settled its completion. Rhetoric sharpened its restriction. And revelation made it decisive.

But meaning alone does not complete the picture. The chapters that follow turn from the testimony's structure to its conditions, its weight in the scales, and the boundaries that protect it — because a testimony understood but not lived remains a key without teeth. Part IV addresses what the testimony demands of the one who speaks it, what it carries when those demands are met, and what breaches the covenant it establishes.

## **PART IV — Conditions, Consequences, and Weight**

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## Chapter 13 — The Conditions (Shurūṭ) of the Testimony

The book has now established what the testimony means. It has traced the grammar, weighed the predicate, examined the restriction mechanism, and shown that the Qur'an governs the answer at every level. The result is clear: there is no true object of worship except Allah.

But meaning is not the whole story. A person can know what the testimony means and still not have it count. The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did not say “whoever says لا إله إلا الله will enter Paradise.” He said “whoever dies knowing,” “whoever says it sincerely from his heart,” “whoever says it being absolutely certain.” Each of those qualifications is a condition. And without them, the testimony is a key without teeth — the shape is right, but the door does not open.

This chapter draws the conditions directly from the Prophetic texts, and — critically — shows how each one arises from the grammar and theology that preceded it. The conditions are not an appendix to the testimony. They are built into its structure.

### Condition 1 — Knowledge (al-‘ilm — العلم)

The first condition is knowledge of what the testimony negates and what it affirms — as opposed to ignorance of its meaning.

**Evidence.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Whoever dies knowing (يَعْلَمُ) that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allāh will enter Paradise.” (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, narrated by ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān.)

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** This condition corresponds directly to the inquiry of this entire work. The knowledge demanded is not vague awareness that the shahādah exists, but specific understanding of what it negates — all false objects of worship, through the categorical

negation established in Chapter 5 — and what it affirms — Allāh’s exclusive right to worship, through the worship-centered predicate established in Chapter 8. Qur’an 47:19 governs this point: «فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ» — “So know that there is no deity except Allāh.” The command is to know — not merely to say.

This is why the entire grammatical study matters for the conditions. The first condition — knowledge — is precisely what the first eleven chapters of this book are designed to deliver.

## Condition 2 — Certainty (al-yaqīn — اليقين)

The second condition is unwavering conviction in the heart, as opposed to doubt.

**Evidence.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Whoever you meet behind this wall who testifies that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allāh, being absolutely certain of it in his heart (مُسْتَيَقِنًا بِهَا قَلْبُهُ), give him the glad tidings of Paradise.” (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, narrated by Abū Hurayrah.)

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** Certainty is what categorical negation demands at the level of conviction. The لَا that negates the entire genus does not leave room for “perhaps” or “mostly.” It sweeps away every claimed deity definitively and without residual ambiguity — as established in Chapter 5, §5.1. The heart’s certainty must match the sentence’s grammatical totality. If the grammar tolerates no exception, the heart must tolerate no doubt.

## Condition 3 — Sincerity (al-ikhḷāṣ — الإخلاص)

The third condition is that the testimony be uttered seeking only the face of Allāh, as opposed to worldly motives, social conformity, or hidden shirk.

**Evidence.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Indeed, Allāh has forbidden the Fire for the one who says ‘Lā ilāha illā Allāh,’ seeking by that the face of Allāh.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, narrated by ‘Itbān ibn Mālīk.)

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** Sincerity is the lived equivalent of the worship-centered predicate. If the testimony means “there is no deity rightfully worshipped except Allāh,” then the one who utters it must actually direct worship to Allāh alone — not divide it, not dilute it, not

perform it for the sake of appearances. The predicate مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقٍّ (rightfully worshipped) carries sincerity within itself: rightful worship is by definition sincere worship.

#### Condition 4 — Truthfulness (al-ṣidq — الصدق)

The fourth condition is that the tongue and the heart be in seamless alignment, as opposed to hypocrisy.

**Evidence.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Glad tidings to those who witness that there is no deity except Allāh, truthfully from the heart (صَادِقًا بِهَا).” (Musnad Aḥmad, authenticated by al-Albānī in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi‘, no. 35, narrated by Abū Mūsā.)

And he said: “There is none who testifies that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allāh and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allāh, truthfully from his heart (صَادِقًا مِنْ قَلْبِهِ), except that Allāh makes him forbidden for the Fire.” (Musnad Aḥmad and the Ṣaḥīḥayn, authenticated by al-Albānī in al-Silsilah al-Ṣaḥīḥah, no. 1204, narrated by Mu‘adh.)

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** The testimony’s structure operates through negation followed by affirmation. Truthfulness means the speaker’s internal state matches both halves: the heart genuinely rejects all false objects of worship (matching the negation of لَا إِلَهَ) and genuinely affirms Allāh’s exclusive right (matching the affirmation of إِلَّا اللَّهُ). A disconnect between tongue and heart breaks the testimony at its structural seam.

#### Condition 5 — Love (al-maḥabbah — المحبة)

The fifth condition is love for the testimony and what it requires, as opposed to aversion or resentment toward its demands.

**Evidence.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Three things: whoever possesses them will taste the sweetness of faith — that Allāh and His Messenger be more beloved to him than all else, that he love a person only for the sake of Allāh, and that he hate to return to disbelief as he would hate to be thrown into the Fire.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim.)

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** Ibn Taymiyyah defined the ilāh as the object toward which hearts turn “in love, fear, hope, reliance, and surrender” — as cited in Chapter 11. Love is not an emotional supplement to the testimony. It is part of what divinity (ulūhiyyah) means. The

one who affirms Allāh as the sole مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقٍّ but resents the obligations that follow has not fulfilled what the affirmation carries.

## Condition 6 — Submission (al-inqiyād — الانقياد)

The sixth condition is physical and practical surrender to what the testimony demands, as opposed to rebellion or selective compliance.

**Evidence.** Allāh Most High said: «وَمَنْ يُسَلِّمْ وَجْهَهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَهُوَ مُحْسِنٌ فَقَدْ اسْتَمْسَكَ بِالْعُرْوَةِ الْوُثْقَىٰ» (سورة لقمان: 22) — “And whoever submits his face to Allāh while being a doer of good has grasped the most trustworthy handhold.” The “most trustworthy handhold” (العروة الوثقى — al-‘urwah al-wuthqā) is identified in the tafsīr tradition with لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ.

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** The testimony’s restriction mechanism — exclusive confinement (al-ḥaṣr), established in Chapter 10 — strips the right to worship from everything in existence and confines it to Allāh alone. Submission is the behavioral consequence of that restriction: if worship belongs to Allāh alone, then the limbs must follow where the tongue and heart have already gone.

## Condition 7 — Acceptance (al-qabūl — القبول)

The seventh condition is wholehearted acceptance of the testimony and everything it entails, as opposed to rejection or arrogant refusal.

**Evidence.** The Qur’an records that the first hearers of the testimony refused it precisely because they understood its totality: «إِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا إِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ يَسْتَكْبِرُونَ» (سورة الصافات: 35) — “Indeed, when it was said to them, ‘There is no deity but Allāh,’ they were arrogant.” Their arrogance was not ignorance — it was refusal to accept what they understood perfectly well.

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** This verse was cited in Chapter 3 as evidence that the first hearers understood the shahādah’s force. Their rejection confirms, from the opposite direction, that acceptance is a condition: they knew what it meant, they refused to accept it, and the Qur’an identified that refusal as the defining failure.



## Condition 8 — Rejection of false deities (al-kufr bi-l-ṭāghūt — الكفر بالطاغوت)

The eighth condition is active disavowal of all that is worshipped besides Allāh, as opposed to passive tolerance of rival claims.

**Evidence.** Allāh Most High said: «فَمَنْ يَكْفُرْ بِالطَّاغُوتِ وَيُؤْمِنِ بِاللَّهِ فَقَدِ اسْتَمْسَكَ بِالْعُرْوَةِ الْوُثْقَىٰ» (سورة البقرة: 256) — “Whoever rejects the ṭāghūt and believes in Allāh has grasped the most trustworthy handhold.”

**Connection to the grammatical analysis.** This condition maps directly onto the two halves of the testimony itself. The negation — لَا إِلَهَ — is the rejection of the ṭāghūt. The affirmation — إِلَّا اللَّهُ — is belief in Allāh. The Qur’anic verse pairs them in the same order as the shahādah’s own grammar: rejection first, then affirmation. Later scholars formalized this as a distinct eighth condition to explicitly counter forms of passive syncretism — in which a person affirms Allāh’s divinity without actively rejecting the false objects of worship that surround them.

The pattern is undeniable. Every condition maps back to something the grammar established. Knowledge is what the entire grammatical study provides. Certainty mirrors the totality of categorical negation. Sincerity and truthfulness mirror the worship-centered predicate. Love matches the definition of ulūhiyyah. Submission matches the force of restriction. Acceptance mirrors the Qur’an’s own demand on the first hearers. And rejection of false deities mirrors the two-part structure of negation followed by affirmation. The conditions are not external impositions upon the shahādah. They are its grammar, lived.

## The Grammar, Lived — From Structure to Condition

| PART II: THE GRAMMAR                                   | CONNECTION                               | PART IV: THE LIVED REALITY                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Categorical Negation</b><br>لا النافية للجنس        | Sweeps away ambiguity →                  | <b>Certainty &amp; Acceptance</b><br>اليقين والقبول   |
| <b>Worship-Centered Predicate</b><br>مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقِّ | Demands exclusive devotion<br>→          | <b>Sincerity &amp; Truthfulness</b><br>الإخلاص والصدق |
| <b>Exclusive Restriction</b><br>الْحَصْرُ              | Confines worship to Allāh<br>alone →     | <b>Submission &amp; Love</b><br>الانقياد والمحبة      |
| <b>Negation + Affirmation</b><br>Two-Half Structure    | Negates the idol, affirms the<br>Truth → | <b>Rejection of False Deities</b><br>الكفر بالطاغوت   |

## Chapter 13 — Closing takeaway

The testimony without its conditions is a key without teeth. Each condition corresponds to something the grammatical and theological analysis already established — and each one is attested directly in the words of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, or in the Qur'an itself. The next chapter turns to what the testimony carries when its conditions are met: a weight that outweighs the heavens and the earth, the saving grace on the Day of Judgment, and the Prophet's intercession reserved for those whose hearts harbored unadulterated sincerity.

## Chapter 14 — The Weight, the Scales, and the Saving Grace

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The conditions have been laid out. Now: what happens when they are fulfilled?

The Prophetic tradition assigns the testimony a weight that no other phrase in the religion receives. It is the best of all remembrance. It outweighs the seven heavens and the seven earths. It rescues a man whose sins fill ninety-nine scrolls stretching as far as the eye can see. And it is reserved, in its saving power, for those who spoke it with a state of heart that matched the totality of what the words carry.

This chapter is not about empty incantations. It is about the relationship between the sentence's internal structure — its grammatical totality, its restriction, its worship-centered predicate — and the weight that structure carries when the conditions are alive in the heart of the one who speaks it.

### The best remembrance

The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “The best remembrance (dhikr) is لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ” (Jāmi‘ al-Tirmidhī and Sunan Ibn Mājah, graded ḥasan.)

Ibn Taymiyyah analyzed this hadith extensively, noting that the superiority of this phrase over all other forms of dhikr lies in its completeness: it is a doctrinally sound sentence that establishes both negation and affirmation simultaneously. Isolating the divine name — chanting “Allāh, Allāh” without the sentence's structure — lacks the theological architecture that makes the shahādah what it is. The negation clears the field; the affirmation fills it. A dhikr that omits either half has abandoned the very structure that gives the phrase its force.

This connects directly to the grammar. The testimony's power as dhikr is not incantatory — it does not work by repetition of sound. It works because the sentence, every time it is spoken with understanding, performs a total act: negating every false claim to worship and affirming Allāh's exclusive right. That is what categorical negation and the worship-centered predicate accomplish together.

The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, also said: “The best supplication is the supplication on the Day of ‘Arafah, and the best of what I and the Prophets before me have said is:

«لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَحْدَهُ لَا شَرِيكَ لَهُ، لَهُ الْمُلْكُ وَلَهُ الْحَمْدُ وَهُوَ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ»

(None has the right to be worshipped except Allāh, alone, without partner. To Him belongs all sovereignty and praise, and He is over all things omnipotent. — *Lā ilāha illā Allāh waḥdahū lā sharīka lah, lahu al-mulku wa lahu al-ḥamdu wa huwa ‘alā kulli shay’in qadīr.*)” (Recorded by Imām Mālik in *al-Muwaṭṭa’*, mursal; Imām al-Tirmidhī, graded ḥasan gharīb.)

And he said: “Faith has over seventy branches... the highest of them is the saying ‘لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ’, and the lowest of them is removing a harmful object from the road.” (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, narrated by Abū Hurayrah.)

## The cosmic weight

The Prophetic tradition assigns the testimony a weight that exceeds the created universe.

**The counsel of Nūḥ.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, narrated the deathbed counsel of the Prophet Nūḥ to his son: “I command you with لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ. For indeed, if the seven heavens and the seven earths were placed in one pan of the scale, and لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ was placed in the other pan, لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ would outweigh them.” (Musnad Aḥmad, graded ḥasan by Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ūṭ.)

**The request of Mūsā.** Mūsā asked Allāh to teach him a unique remembrance. Allāh replied: “Say, O Mūsā, لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ.” Mūsā said that all creation says this. Allāh responded: “O Mūsā, if the seven heavens and their inhabitants besides Me, and the seven earths were placed in a scale, and لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ was placed in a scale, لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ would outweigh them.” (Narrated by Ibn Ḥibbān and al-Ḥākim in his *Mustadrak*, who authenticated it. [See Endnote, Ch. 14, n. 2 for the critical isnād note.])

That weight is not merely the physical ink and paper of the scrolls. It is the cosmic weight of its meaning, carried by the absolute sincerity of the one who spoke it. The grammatical totality of categorical negation — its sweeping, genus-wide, definitively universal scope — is the linguistic vehicle for that cosmic weight.

## The saving grace: the hadith of the Card (al-Biṭāqah)

The most vivid Prophetic illustration of the testimony's weight is the hadith of the Card.

A man from the ummah is brought forward on the Day of Judgment. Ninety-nine scrolls of his sins are unrolled — each stretching as far as the eye can see. He is asked: “Do you deny any of this?” He says: “No, my Lord.” Then a small card (biṭāqah) is brought forth, inscribed with:

«أَشْهَدُ أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَأَشْهَدُ أَنَّ مُحَمَّدًا عَبْدُهُ وَرَسُولُهُ»

(I bear witness that there is no deity except Allāh and I bear witness that Muḥammad is His servant and His messenger.) The scrolls are placed in one pan and the card in the other. The scrolls are light, and the card is heavy — for nothing is heavy against the name of Allāh. (Jāmi‘ al-Tirmidhī, Sunan Ibn Mājah, and Musnad Aḥmad, authenticated by al-Albānī.)

Ibn al-Qayyim explains that the man was not saved by the bare pronunciation of the words. He was saved because of the extraordinary state of his heart when he uttered them — a state of immense sincerity and profound repentance that spiritually eclipsed the weight of his transgressions. [See Endnote, Ch. 14, n. 1.]

This hadith also answers the accusation of superficiality — that “just saying the words” saves. The tradition does not teach that pronunciation saves. It teaches that the testimony, spoken with its conditions fulfilled, carries a weight that nothing else in creation can match. The words are the vehicle; the conditions are the substance.

## Intercession and the deathbed

**Intercession.** Abū Hurayrah asked who would be the most fortunate to receive the Prophet's intercession on the Day of Judgment. The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, replied: “The most fortunate of people with my intercession is the one who says لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ sincerely from his

heart (خَالِصًا مِنْ قَلْبِهِ).” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī.) The intercession is not a blanket amnesty. It is restricted to those whose hearts harbored unadulterated sincerity — the third condition.

**The deathbed.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “He whose last words are لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ will enter Paradise.” (Sunan Abī Dāwūd and Musnad Aḥmad, graded ṣaḥīḥ.) This hadith was cited in Chapter 3 among the foundational scriptural references. Its return here completes a circle: the work began by grounding the testimony in revelation, and it arrives here to show what happens when a life lived under the testimony’s conditions ends with its words on the tongue.

**The ultimate saving grace.** The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Whoever says لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ, it will benefit him one day from his lifetime, even if he is afflicted before that by whatever afflicts him.” (Authenticated by al-Albānī in al-Silsilah al-Ṣaḥīḥah; cited in al-Durar al-Saniyyah.) This hadith refutes the position that major sins expel a person from Islam permanently. Believers who commit major sins without committing shirk may be punished temporarily, but their foundational tawḥīd guarantees their ultimate salvation. The testimony’s negation and affirmation, once genuinely established in the heart, are not erased by sin — they are the ground on which the sinner stands when everything else has fallen away.

## Chapter 14 — Closing takeaway

The testimony’s weight is not incantatory. It does not save by repetition of sound. It saves because of what it carries: a total negation of every false claim to worship and a total affirmation of Allāh’s exclusive right — spoken with knowledge, certainty, sincerity, truthfulness, love, submission, acceptance, and rejection of all that is worshipped besides Him. When those conditions are met, the sentence outweighs the heavens and the earth, secures the Prophet’s intercession, and accompanies the believer to the last breath.

The next chapter addresses the other side of this reality: what happens when the covenant established by the testimony is broken.

## Chapter 15 — The Nullifiers: What Breaches the Testimony

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This chapter is written with a deep awareness of its weight. What follows addresses the boundaries of the testimony — the acts that breach the covenant between the servant and Allāh. These boundaries must be known. A believer who does not know where the edges of the testimony are cannot protect the testimony within his own heart. But they must be known in the right spirit: as a mirror turned inward, not as a weapon pointed outward.

**A necessary caution.** Identifying the categories of nullification is a scholarly obligation. It protects the believer from unknowingly crossing a line that voids the very declaration on which his salvation rests. But applying those categories to specific individuals is an entirely different act — a judicial act that requires verification of conditions, removal of impediments, and a level of authority that no layperson possesses. The distinction between declaring an act to be nullifying and declaring a specific person to be outside Islam is one of the most important boundaries in Sunni jurisprudence.

The Khawārij of old — and modern extremists who follow their path — deviate precisely here. They collapse the category into the person. They hear that an act is nullifying and immediately excommunicate the one who committed it, without asking whether the conditions for applying that ruling to that individual have been met. This chapter does the opposite. It maps the theological boundaries to protect your own soul and to teach you what the testimony requires. It is not a checklist for judging others.

### The framework: negation and affirmation as a binding structure

The testimony's two halves — negation of all false objects of worship and affirmation of Allāh's exclusive right — are not independent statements that can be partially honored. They form one indivisible covenant. A breach of either half damages the whole.



This is a direct consequence of the grammatical structure analyzed in Part II. The categorical negation (لا النافية للجنس) negates the entire genus of deities without exception. The affirmation through **إلا الله** confines rightful worship to Allāh alone. Any act that re-admits a false object of worship into the space cleared by the negation, or that removes Allāh from the position secured by the affirmation, is structurally a reversal of what the testimony established.

## The major categories of nullification

The scholarly tradition has identified several categories of acts that nullify the testimony. The following draws on the classifications found in the works of the scholars of tawḥīd, particularly those associated with the Najdī da‘wah, who formalized these categories for pedagogical clarity.

1. **Directing acts of worship to other than Allāh (al-shirk fī al-‘ibādah — الشُّرك في العبادة).** This is the most direct breach. The testimony affirmed that Allāh alone is the rightful object of worship. Directing acts of worship — such as ritual sacrifice, prostration, or supplication in the manner reserved for the divine — to saints, prophets, graves, jinn, or any created being reverses the affirmation and re-populates the space the negation had cleared.

Allāh Most High said: (سورة النساء: 48) «إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَغْفِرُ أَنْ يُشْرَكَ بِهِ وَيَغْفِرُ مَا دُونَ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ يَشَاءُ» — “Indeed, Allāh does not forgive association with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He wills.”

2. **Setting up intermediaries (ittikhādh al-wasā’it — اتخاذ الوسائط).** Taking intermediaries and relying upon them for intercession in the manner that the pre-Islamic polytheists relied upon their idols contradicts the exclusive directness of worship that the testimony demands.

«مَا نَعْبُدُهُمْ إِلَّا لِيُقَرِّبُونَا إِلَى اللَّهِ زُلْفَى» (سورة الزمر: 3)

“We only worship them that they may bring us nearer to Allāh in position.” The Qur’an rejected this as a false claim: the worship itself — regardless of the stated motive — is what violates the testimony.”

3. **Hatred of what the Messenger brought (karāhiyyat mā jā’a bihi al-Rasūl — كراهية ما جاء به الرسول).** The testimony of Muḥammad’s messengership is inseparable from the testimony of Allāh’s



oneness. Hating any part of what the Prophet brought — even while practicing it outwardly — contradicts the conditions of acceptance and love established in Chapter 13.

«ذَلِكَ بِأَنَّهُمْ كَرِهُوا مَا أُنْزِلَ اللَّهُ فَاحْبَطَ أَعْمَالَهُمْ» (سورة محمد: 9)

"“That is because they disliked what Allāh revealed, so He rendered their deeds worthless.”"

4. **Mockery of Allāh, His Messenger, or the Qur'an** (al-istihzā' bi-l-dīn — الاستهزاء بالدين). This breaches the testimony at the level of reverence. The ilāh — the one worshipped — is by definition the one held in the highest awe. Mocking the divine, the prophetic, or the revealed text is structurally incompatible with the reverence that divinity (ulūhiyyah) demands.

«قُلْ أَبِاللَّهِ وَآيَاتِهِ وَرَسُولِهِ كُنْتُمْ تَسْتَهْزِئُونَ لَا تَعْتَذِرُوا قَدْ كَفَرْتُمْ بَعْدَ إِيمَانِكُمْ» (سورة التوبة: 65-66)

"“Say: ‘Is it Allāh, His verses, and His Messenger that you were mocking? Make no excuse; you have disbelieved after your belief.’”"

5. **Total abandonment of the religion** (al-i'rāḍ al-kullī — الإعراض الكلي). This is not the failure to perform every obligation perfectly — that is the condition of most believers and falls under the category of sin, not nullification. What is meant here is the total turning away: neither learning the foundational tenets nor acting upon any of them, and living as though the testimony had never been spoken.

«وَمَنْ أَظْلَمُ مِمَّنْ ذُكِّرَ بِآيَاتِ رَبِّهِ ثُمَّ أَعْرَضَ عَنْهَا» (سورة السجدة: 22)

"“And who is more unjust than one who is reminded of the verses of his Lord and then turns away from them?”"

The scholarly tradition distinguishes carefully between partial neglect (which is sin) and total abandonment (which is nullification). The distinction is important and must not be collapsed.

6. **The claim that certain individuals are above the shari'ah** (da'wā isqāṭ al-taklīf — دعوى إسقاط التكليف). The esoteric claim — found in some strands of heterodox Sufism — that a “saint” or

“realized knower” reaches a spiritual station where the obligations of Islamic law no longer apply is a direct contradiction of the testimony’s structure. The testimony confines worship to Allāh alone and submission to His law. A claim to be exempt from that law while still claiming to be within the faith is a structural impossibility.

## Chapter 15 — Closing takeaway

The nullifiers are not a checklist for accusing others. They are a map of the boundaries within which the testimony remains intact — a mirror for the believer to examine his own covenant with Allāh. Each category corresponds to something the grammatical and theological analysis established: shirk reverses the total negation; intermediaries repopulate the space the negation cleared; hatred and mockery violate the conditions of acceptance and reverence; total abandonment empties the testimony of its behavioral content; and claims to be above the law contradict the submission that the affirmation demands.

Knowing these boundaries is part of knowing the testimony itself — which is the first condition with which the previous chapter began.

The conclusion that follows restates the full arc of this study: from the structure of the sentence to the meaning it carries, from the conditions it demands to the weight it bears, and from the covenant it establishes to the boundaries that protect it.

## **PART V — Conclusion and Appendices**

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## Chapter 16 — Conclusion

This study set out to answer one question: what does **لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ** actually say — and what does it demand?

The answer moved through five stages.

It began with revelation. The Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah established, before any grammatical analysis, that worship belongs to Allāh alone, that false gods must be rejected, and that the shahādah carries consequence in life, devotion, and final speech.

It then entered the grammar. The **لَا** in «**لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ**» was shown to be categorical negation — the type that wipes out the entire genus of deities with the force of total disavowal. The divine name Allāh was traced to the derivation that ties it to worship. The exception construction was analyzed. The omitted predicate was settled: not “existing” (**مَوْجُودٌ**), which would merely affirm what the polytheists already believed, but “rightfully worshipped” (**مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقٍّ**), which demands what they killed to resist. The grammatical positions of the divine name after **إِلَّا** were weighed, and the predicative analysis was shown to yield monotheism by unanimous agreement across all legal-theoretical schools.

It then showed how the testimony delivers its total force. The restriction mechanism (**al-ḥaṣr** — **الْحَصْرُ**) strips the right to worship from everything in existence and confines it to Allāh alone — regardless of the uṣūlī classification one assigns to it, and regardless of one's school of thought on the signification of exception.

It then turned from structure to obligation. Eight conditions were drawn from the Prophetic qualifications attached to the testimony: knowledge, certainty, sincerity, truthfulness, love, submission, acceptance, and rejection of false deities. Each was shown to arise directly from the grammar. The testimony's weight — in remembrance, in the scales, in intercession, and at the deathbed — was shown to depend on the state of the heart, not the sound of the tongue. And the

boundaries of the covenant were mapped: the acts that reverse the negation, violate the conditions, or empty the testimony of its content.

The result is simple but total:

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ means: there is no true object of worship except Allāh.

This is not a formula to be repeated without understanding. It is a covenant. It negates every false claim to worship. It affirms Allāh's exclusive right. It demands knowledge, sincerity, certainty, love, and submission from the one who speaks it. It carries a weight that exceeds the heavens and the earth when its conditions are met. And it defines the boundaries that protect the believer's faith from what would destroy it.

Whoever says this testimony with knowledge, truthfulness, and surrender should hear in it a total renunciation of all false worship, a total devotion to Allāh alone, and a commitment to live by what the words carry until the moment he stands before the One who hears them.

We ask Allāh to grant us understanding of this testimony, sincerity in speaking it, and steadfastness in living by it. We ask Him to make it the last thing on our tongues and the heaviest thing on our scales. And we ask Him to gather us under its shade on a Day when there will be no shade but His.

وَصَلَّى اللَّهُ وَسَلَّم عَلَى نَبِيِّنَا مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِهِ وَصَحْبِهِ أَجْمَعِينَ.

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## Endnotes

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**Chapter 6, n. 1 — Comparative Semitic cognates of the divine name.** The Hebrew language and Arabic are sister languages, both branches of the Proto-Semitic (السامية الأم) mother tongue. It is more likely that the name «الله» — being among the most supremely important of names — existed in the proto-language and descended into both branches with minor phonetic variations, as is customary. To the best of the author’s knowledge, Hebrew uses the word «אלהים» (Elohim), which is morphologically plural. Yet Jewish readers pronounce it «Adonai» (meaning “the Lord”) to avoid the written plural form. The divergence between the written and spoken forms in the Jewish liturgical tradition is itself a point of interest for comparative study, though it falls outside the scope of this work.

**Chapter 12, n. 1 — Al-Rāzī’s Kalām anxiety.** Al-Rāzī’s concern was not merely grammatical. As one of the towering figures of Ash‘arī kalām, he operated within a theological framework that placed Allāh’s absolute transcendence (tanzīh) above all other considerations. His fear was that supplying any predicate — even **مَوْجُودٌ** — would inadvertently limit the scope of divine oneness by allowing the mind to conceive of the category “deity” as having real instances, whether existing or possible, that could then be measured against Allāh. For al-Rāzī, leaving the negation absolute — without a predicate to narrow it — was the safest way to protect the testimony from even the theoretical possibility of granting ontological reality to false gods.

**Chapter 13, n. 1 — Source for the eighth condition.** The formalization of rejection of false deities (al-kufr bi-l-ṭāghūt) as a distinct eighth condition is associated with later scholars of the Najdī tawḥīd tradition. See Ḥāfiẓ al-Ḥakamī, Ma‘ārij al-Qabūl bi-Sharḥ Sullam al-Wuṣūl; and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ḥasan, Faṭḥ al-Majīd Sharḥ Kitāb al-Tawḥīd.

**Chapter 14, n. 1 — Ibn al-Qayyim on the hadith of the Card.** Ibn al-Qayyim’s explanation that the man was saved by the extraordinary state of his heart — not the bare pronunciation of the words — is found in Madārij al-Sālikīn and al-Wābil al-Ṣayyib.

**Chapter 14, n. 2 — Critical isnād note on the hadith of Mūsā’s request.** The chain contains Darrāj Abū al-Samḥ reporting from Abū al-Haytham — a link criticized by Imām Aḥmad. However,

Athari scholars affirm that the meaning is undeniably true, being supported by the authentic hadith of Nūḥ (Musnad Aḥmad, graded ḥasan by Shu‘ayb al-Arna‘ūt).

**Chapter 15, n. 1 — Source for nullifier categories.** The classification of nullifiers draws on Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Waḥḥāb, *Nawāqid al-Islām*; and Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān, *Sharḥ Nawāqid al-Islām*.

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## Appendix A — Glossary of Technical Terms

| ENGLISH TERM                  | ARABIC (WITH TASHKĪL)       | TRANSLITERATION         | DEFINITION                                                             | CH. |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Canonical usage               | الْعُرْفُ الشَّرْعِيُّ      | al-‘urf al-shar‘ī       | The meaning a term carries in the sharī‘ah, beyond its linguistic root | 10  |
| Categorical negation          | لَا النَّافِيَةُ لِلْجِنْسِ | lā al-nāfiyah li-l-jins | The لا that negates an entire class or genus                           | 5   |
| Conditions                    | الشُّرُوطُ                  | al-shurūṭ               | Prerequisites that must be met for the testimony to count              | 13  |
| Disavowal particle            | لَا التَّبْرِئَةَ           | lā al-tabri’ah          | The لا of total disavowal or absolute negation                         | 5   |
| Divinity / worship-worthiness | الْأُلُوْهِيَّةُ            | al-ulūhiyyah            | The quality of being worthy of worship                                 | 11  |
| Exception                     | الِاسْتِثْنَاءُ             | al-istithnā’            | The grammatical mechanism of                                           | 7   |



| ENGLISH TERM     | ARABIC (WITH TASHKĪL)    | TRANSLITERATION      | DEFINITION                                                          | CH. |
|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
|                  |                          |                      | extracting one element from a group                                 |     |
| Explicit meaning | الْمَنْطُوقُ             | al-manṭūq            | What the wording directly states at the point of utterance          | 10  |
| False deity      | الطَّاغُوتُ              | al-ṭāghūt            | Any object of worship set up as a rival to Allāh                    | 13  |
| Implied meaning  | الْمَفْهُومُ             | al-mafhūm            | What the wording indicates without directly stating it              | 10  |
| Implied opposite | مَفْهُومُ الْمُخَالَفَةِ | mafhum al-mukhālafah | The inference that the opposite ruling applies to the unstated case | 10  |
| Inferred wording | التَّقْدِيرُ             | al-taqdīr            | Wording supplied by ellipsis to complete a sentence                 | 5   |

| ENGLISH TERM          | ARABIC (WITH TASHKĪL) | TRANSLITERATION | DEFINITION                                               | CH. |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Lordship              | الرُّبُوبِيَّةُ       | al-rubūbiyyah   | The quality of creating, sustaining, and governing       | 11  |
| Monotheism            | التَّوْحِيدُ          | al-tawhīd       | Singling out Allāh alone for worship                     | 1   |
| Nullifiers            | النَّوَاقِضُ          | al-nawāqid      | Acts that breach the covenant of the testimony           | 15  |
| Predicate             | الْخَبَرُ             | al-khabar       | What completes the predication in a nominal sentence     | 8   |
| Predicative analysis  | الْخَبَرِيَّةُ        | al-khabariyyah  | The parsing that treats the divine name as the predicate | 9   |
| Restriction           | الْحَصْرُ             | al-ḥaṣr         | Exclusive confinement of a quality to a single entity    | 10  |
| Rightfully worshipped | مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقٍّ     | ma'būd bi-ḥaqq  | The one who alone deserves                               | 8   |

| ENGLISH TERM       | ARABIC (WITH TASHKĪL)         | TRANSLITERATION           | DEFINITION                                                | CH. |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----|
|                    |                               |                           | acts of worship                                           |     |
| Stripped exception | المُفَرَّغُ                   | al-mufarragh              | Exception where the governing force reaches beyond لا     | 7   |
| Substitution       | البَدَلُ                      | al-badal                  | Apposition — one element standing in the place of another | 9   |
| Unit negation      | لَا النَّافِيَةُ لِلْوَحْدَةِ | lā al-nāfiyah li-l-waḥdah | The لا that negates only a single individual              | 5   |
|                    |                               |                           |                                                           |     |
|                    |                               |                           |                                                           |     |

## Appendix B — Principal Scholars Cited in This Study

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The following note cards identify the principal scholars cited in this study. Each card records the scholar's name, dates, field of expertise, major works, and the specific reason for citation in this argument.

**‘Alī al-Qārī** (عَلِيّ الْقَارِي). Died in Mecca 1014/1605–06. Hanafi scholar. Major work: *Mirqāt al-Mafātīḥ*. Cited in Ch. 1 for the opening framing: the testimony must be understood in both wording and meaning.

**Sibawayh** — **‘Amr ibn ‘Uthmān ibn Qanbar** (سَيِّبَوَيْه — عَمْرُو بْنُ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ قَنْبَرٍ). Died c. 180/796. Founding master of Basran grammar. Major work: *Al-Kitāb*. Cited in Chs. 5–7 for the structure of لا, exception, and the morphology of the divine name.

**‘Abbās Ḥasan** (عَبَّاسٌ حَسَنٌ). Died 1978. Modern Egyptian grammarian. Major work: *Al-Naḥw al-Wāfi*. Cited in Ch. 5 for making the genus/unit negation distinction accessible.

**Raḍī al-Dīn al-Astarābādī** (الرَّضِيُّ الْأَسْتَرَابَادِي). Died c. 686/1287. Persian grammarian. Major work: *Sharḥ al-Kāfiyah*. Cited in Ch. 5 for indeclinability and the definition of exception.

**Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dasūqī** (الدُّسُوقِي). Died 1230/1815. Egyptian Mālikī scholar. Major work: *Ḥaṣhiyat al-Dasūqī ‘alā Umm al-Barāhīn*. Cited in Chs. 5, 8, 9 for objection-and-reply method.

**Abū al-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī** (الزَّمَخْشَرِي). Died 538/1144. Philologist and Qur’an commentator. Major work: *Al-Kashshāf*. Cited in Ch. 11 for reading ilāh in a way tied to worship.

**Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī** (فَخْرُ الدِّينِ الرَّازِي). Died 606/1209. Theologian and exegete. Major work: *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*. Cited in Ch. 8 for stating the strongest case for refusing a supplied predicate.

**Muḥibb al-Dīn Nāẓir al-Jaysh** (نَاطِرُ الْجَيْشِ). Died 778/1376–77. Grammarian and commentator. Major work: *Tamhīd al-Qawā’id*. Cited in Chs. 9–10 for the argument that only the khabariyyah yields universal ḥaṣr.

**Ibn Taymiyyah** (ابْنُ تَيْمِيَّةَ). Died 728/1328. Ḥanbalī theologian. Major works: *Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā*, *Al-‘Ubūdiyyah*. Cited in Chs. 11, 13 for defining ilāh through worship, love, surrender, and dependence.

**Ibn Rajab** (ابن رَجَب). Died 795/1393. Ḥanbalī hadith scholar. Major work: *Jāmi‘ al-‘Ulūm wa-l-Ḥikam*. Cited in Ch. 11 for the lived meaning of the testimony.

**Ibn al-Qayyim** (ابن الْقَيِّم). Died 751/1350. Theologian and spiritual writer. Major work: *Madārij al-Sālikīn*. Cited in Ch. 14 for the explanation of the hadith of the Card.

**Ibn ‘Uthaymīn** (ابن عُثَيْمِينَ). Died 1421/2001. Modern Ḥanbalī jurist. Major work: *Al-Qawl al-Mufīd*. Cited in Ch. 11 for the worship-centered rendering in plain language.

**Ibn ‘Āshūr** (ابن عَاشُورٍ). Died 1393/1973. Tunisian Mālikī exegete. Major work: *Al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr*. Cited in Ch. 6 for the broadest modern synthetic treatment of the divine name.

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## Appendix C — Principal Sources Used in This Study

| WORK                | AUTHOR                             | DISCIPLINE            | FUNCTION IN THIS STUDY                             |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| Al-Taṣrīḥ           | Al-Azharī<br>(d. 905/1499)         | Grammar               | Precise definitions around لا التبرئة              |
| Al-Naḥw al-Wāfi     | ‘Abbās Ḥasan<br>(d. 1978)          | Modern grammar        | Teaching clarity on classical categories           |
| Umm al-Barāhīn      | Al-Sanūsī<br>(d. 895/1490)         | Creed                 | Rational vocabulary for the predicate debate       |
| Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī  | Al-Dasūqī<br>(d. 1230/1815)        | Creed supercommentary | Fine distinctions on من, the predicate, and بدل    |
| Al-Kashshāf         | Al-Zamakhsharī<br>(d. 538/1144)    | Qur’anic exegesis     | Where grammatical nuance carries theological force |
| Sharḥ al-Kāfiyah    | Al-Raḍī<br>(d. c. 686/1287)        | Advanced grammar      | Indeclinability and grammatical objections         |
| Tamhīd al-Qawā’id   | Nāẓir al-Jaysh<br>(d. 778/1376–77) | Grammar commentary    | Ranking and testing parse positions                |
| Mughnī al-Labīb     | Ibn Hishām<br>(d. 761/1360)        | Grammar               | Semantic-syntactic pressure points                 |
| Badā’i’ al-Fawā’id  | Ibn al-Qayyim<br>(d. 751/1350)     | Theology and lexicon  | The divine name: language, theology, and worship   |
| Sharḥ al-Ṭaḥāwīyyah | Ibn Abī al-‘Izz<br>(d. 792/1390)   | Creed commentary      | Essence, existence, and predication                |

| WORK                  | AUTHOR                                  | DISCIPLINE         | FUNCTION IN THIS STUDY                     |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr | Ibn ‘Āshūr<br>(d. 1393/1973)            | Qur’anic exegesis  | Grammar to rhetoric to Qur’anic worldview  |
| Madārij al-Sālikīn    | Ibn al-Qayyim<br>(d. 751/1350)          | Spiritual theology | The state of the heart behind the shahādah |
| Ma‘ārij al-Qabūl      | Ḥāfiẓ al-Ḥakamī<br>(d. 1377/1957)       | Creed              | Conditions of the testimony                |
| Nawāqid al-Islām      | M. ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb<br>(d. 1206/1792) | Creed / tawḥīd     | Classification of nullifiers               |

## Appendix D — Indexes and Consolidated Tables

### Qur'an and Hadith Index

| REFERENCE           | CHAPTER(S)         | WHY IT IS USED                                               |
|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Al-Baqarah (2:256)  | Ch. 13             | Rejection of ṭāghūt + belief in Allāh                        |
| Āl 'Imrān (3:18)    | Chs. 1, 10, 12, 16 | Testimony grounded in knowledge                              |
| Al-Nisā' (4:48)     | Ch. 15             | Shirk is the unforgivable sin                                |
| Al-A'raf (7:12)     | Ch. 5              | Pleonastic √ example                                         |
| Al-Tawbah (9:65–66) | Ch. 15             | Mockery = disbelief after belief                             |
| Al-Naḥl (16:36)     | Chs. 3, 8, 11, 12  | Pairs worship with rejection of false gods                   |
| Al-Anbiyā' (21:25)  | Chs. 3, 8, 11, 12  | Universal prophetic call to worship Allāh alone              |
| Al-Ḥajj (22:62)     | Chs. 3, 8, 11, 12  | Allāh is the Truth; what is invoked besides Him is falsehood |
| Al-'Ankabūt (29:61) | Chs. 2, 11         | Polytheists admitted Allāh's lordship                        |
| Luqmān (31:22)      | Ch. 13             | The most trustworthy handhold (submission)                   |
| Al-Sajdah (32:22)   | Ch. 15             | Total abandonment                                            |
| Al-Ṣāffāt (37:35)   | Chs. 3, 5, 10, 12  | First hearers resisted the formula's force                   |
| Al-Zumar (39:3)     | Ch. 15             | Polytheists' intermediary justification rejected             |



| REFERENCE                              | CHAPTER(S)            | WHY IT IS USED                               |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Muḥammad (47:9)                        | Ch. 15                | Hatred of revelation renders deeds worthless |
| Muḥammad (47:19)                       | Chs. 1, 8, 12, 13, 16 | The testimony must be known correctly        |
| Al-Ḥadīd (57:29)                       | Ch. 5                 | Emphatic √ example                           |
| Nūḥ (71:23)                            | Ch. 11                | False gods named as worshipped objects       |
| Al-Qiyāmah (75:1)                      | Ch. 5                 | Pleonastic √ example                         |
| Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim — ‘Uthmān                 | Ch. 13                | Condition of knowledge                       |
| Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim — Abū Hurayrah            | Ch. 13                | Condition of certainty                       |
| Bukhārī / Muslim — ‘Itbān              | Ch. 13                | Condition of sincerity                       |
| Musnad Aḥmad — Abū Mūsā                | Ch. 13                | Condition of truthfulness                    |
| Musnad Aḥmad / Ṣaḥīḥayn — Mu‘adh       | Ch. 13                | Condition of truthfulness                    |
| Bukhārī / Muslim                       | Ch. 13                | Condition of love (sweetness of faith)       |
| Jāmi‘ al-Tirmidhī 3383                 | Chs. 1, 3, 14, 16     | The phrase is the best remembrance           |
| Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn 917                   | Chs. 3, 14, 16        | The believer’s final words                   |
| Musnad Aḥmad — Nūḥ’s counsel           | Ch. 14                | Cosmic weight of the testimony               |
| Ibn Ḥibbān / al-Ḥākim — Mūsā’s request | Ch. 14                | Cosmic weight (with isnād note)              |

| REFERENCE                    | CHAPTER(S) | WHY IT IS USED                                         |
|------------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Tirmidhī / Ibn Mājah / Aḥmad | Ch. 14     | The Card (al-Biṭāqah) — saving grace                   |
| Bukhārī — Abū Hurayrah       | Ch. 14     | Intercession restricted to the sincere                 |
| Abū Dāwūd / Aḥmad            | Ch. 14     | Deathbed declaration                                   |
| al-Silsilah al-Ṣaḥīḥah       | Ch. 14     | Ultimate saving grace (refutation of Khārijī position) |
| al-Muwaṭṭaʿ / Tirmidhī       | Ch. 14     | Supplication of ʿArafah                                |
| Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim — Abū Hurayrah  | Ch. 14     | Highest branch of faith is the shahādah                |

## Consolidated Comparison Tables

### Types of لا

| ENGLISH              | ARABIC                        | MEANING                 | WHY IT MATTERS                       |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Categorical negation | لَا النَّافِيَةُ لِلْجِنْسِ   | Negates the whole class | Needed for the shahādah's full scope |
| Unit negation        | لَا النَّافِيَةُ لِلْوَحْدَةِ | Negates one individual  | Too weak for the testimony           |
| Disavowal particle   | لَا النَّبْذِيَّةُ            | Absolute disavowal      | Explains the force of total negation |

### Proposed inferred predicates

| ENGLISH               | ARABIC            | WHAT IT PRESERVES        | JUDGMENT                                |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| Existing              | مَوْجُودٌ         | Breadth of negation      | Not strongest — slips toward lordship   |
| Possible              | مُمْكِنٌ          | Wider abstract scope     | Not strongest — does not clearly affirm |
| Rightfully worshipped | مَعْبُودٌ بِحَقٍّ | Worship-centered meaning | <b>Strongest</b>                        |

#### Main parse directions after **إِلَّا**

| ENGLISH              | ARABIC                           | MAIN IDEA                                  | WEIGHT                    |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Substitution         | الْبَدَلُ                        | Apposition for deleted predicate's pronoun | Serious live position     |
| Predicative          | الْخَبَرِيَّةُ                   | Divine name = the predicate                | Serious live position     |
| Accusative exception | النَّصْبُ عَلَى الْإِسْتِثْنَاءِ | Standard excepted element                  | Allowed but not preferred |

#### Divinity vs. Lordship

| ENGLISH                              | ARABIC          | MEANING                               | WHY THE DISTINCTION MATTERS                                            |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Divinity /<br>worship-<br>worthiness | الْأُلُوهِيَّةُ | The right to<br>be<br>worshipped      | Keeps the testimony centered on exclusive worship                      |
| Lordship                             | الرُّبُوبِيَّةُ | Creating,<br>sustaining,<br>governing | Universally admitted by the Meccan polytheists —<br>insufficient alone |